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COMMENTS
THROWING PERSONAL JURISDICTION INTO THE
POND: MASS-TORT DEFENDANTS' RIGHTS RIPPLE
AWAY IN ASHLEY v. ABBOTT LABORATORIES*
INTRODUCTION
In a decision that contradicts existing standards of in
personam jurisdiction, Judge Jack B. Weinstein of the United
States District Court for the Eastern District of New York
exercised personal jurisdiction over a nonresident drug manu-
facturer that had never sold or marketed its product in New
York. Arguing that the "federalism Due Process" analysis,'
which requires a territorial nexus between the forum and the
defendant, does not adequately address the needs of "mass
tort" plaintiffs,2 Judge Weinstein proffered a revised fairness
* 789 F. Supp. 552 (E.D.N.Y. 1992), appeal dismissed, 7 F.3d 20 (2d Cir.
1993).
1 Federalism due process is synonymous to the sovereignty due process inquiry
which emphasizes a defendant's physical contacts with the forum. This analysis
has its roots in Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. 714 (1878), and has been continually
applied and modified in subsequent decisions.
2 According to Judge Weinstein, a genuine mass tort possesses some or all of
the following features:
(1) geographically widespread exposure to potentially harmful agents that
(2) affects a large or indeterminate number of plaintiffs, (3) possibly over
long time periods, even generations, (4) in different ways such that (5)
there is difficulty in establishing a general theory of causation and (6) an
inability to link a particular defendant's actions to a particular plaintiffs
injuries, as well as (7) difficulty in determining the number of potentially
responsible defendants and (8) in determining their relative culpability, if
any, which often results in (9) multiple litigations that burden the courts
and cause huge transactional costs, including heavy legal fees, and (10)
which threatens the financial ability of many companies or of whole in-
dustries to respond to traditional damage awards.
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analysis that instead focused on a state's interest in resolving
the dispute.' Judge Weinstein relied on the unique, nation-
wide ramifications of mass torts and the expanded notions of
liability developed to resolve the resultant litigation to justify
the need for a modified theory of personal jurisdiction.4 Ac-
cording to his modified analysis, if the forum state has a sub-
stantial interest in adjudicating the dispute and the defendant
can mount a defense in the forum without suffering undue
hardship, then the defendant's right to due process is satis-
fied.5
Ashley v. Abbott Laboratories6 presented Judge Weinstein
with the opportunity to explore the shortcomings of personal
jurisdiction in the mass tort context. In Ashley, New York
residents, who claimed injuries resulting from their exposure
to diethylstilbestrol ("DES"), attempted to recover damages
from two non-resident drug manufacturers.7 The plaintiffs'
claims were based on New York DES law, which permitted
plaintiffs to join all the manufacturers that had produced DES
for use during pregnancy and hold them severally liable for
their individual share of the national market.' The expansive
reach of New York's substantive law, however, clashed with
existing standards of personal jurisdiction under both New
York's long-arm statute and federal due process standards,
each requiring that the defendant have some purposeful con-
tact with the forum. Accordingly, non-resident drug manufac-
turers joined under New York's substantive DES law may not
be amenable to personal. jurisdiction in New York. Judge
Weinstein, however, used Ashley to expand existing notions of
personal jurisdiction, both state and federal, to accommodate
New York's substantive DES law and, in the process, to pro-
vide the plaintiffs in Ashley with full recovery.
This Comment will argue that the judicial activism under-
taken by Judge Weinstein in Ashley resulted in the creation of
Ashley, 789 F. Supp. at 561-62.
" Id. at 587.
4 Id. at 572, 586-88.
" Id. at 586-87.
6 Id. at 552.
1 Id. at 559.
8 See infra text accompanying notes 90-102 (discussing New York's substantive
DES law).
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a theory of personal jurisdiction that is unconstitutionally
premised on the forum's interest9 in resolving the dispute, and
raises questions concerning the proper role of a district court
judge. Part I of this Comment offers an account of DES's infa-
mous history and the resulting litigation difficulties faced by
injured parties. Part II then briefly presents the facts and
procedural history of Ashley v. Abbott Laboratories and sum-
marizes the district court's decision. Finally, Part III analyzes
and critiques the reasoning in the Ashley decision, emphasizing
Judge Weinstein's repeated departure from existing law. The
Comment argues that Judge Weinstein's theory of personal
jurisdiction, premised on the forum's interest in adjudicating
the dispute, violates basic principles of jurisprudence underly-
ing the Federal Constitution.
I. THE BACKGROUND OF DIETHYLSTILBESTROL
DES is the acronym for diethylstilbestrol,"° a synthetic
estrogen developed in England in the late 1930s that mimics
the activity of natural estrogen in the human body." The abil-
ity to replicate the female hormone synthetically was consid-
ered a major scientific breakthrough because the synthetic
estrogen, DES, was substantially less expensive, more potent
and considerably easier and less painful to administer than
natural estrogen. 2 As a result of these advantages, DES be-
came an attractive source of estrogen in Great Britain. 3 Iron-
ically, no patent was ever sought for DES and it was left in the
public domain. 4
' By placing primary emphasis on a state's interest, Judge Weinstein's theory
violates the Due Process Clause by ignoring the defendant's right to due pro-
cess-a right that is unrelated to the forum state's interest. See Bruce N. Morton,
Contacts, Fairness and State Interest: Personal Jurisdiction After Asahi Metal In-
dustry Co. v. Superior Court of California, 9 PACE L. REV. 451 (1989).
"o Bichler v. Eli Lilly & Co., 79 A.D.2d 317, 321, 436 N.Y.S.2d 625, 628 (1st
Dep't 1981), affd, 35 N.Y.2d 571, 436 N.E.2d 182, 450 N.Y.S.2d 776 (1982). DES
is synthesized from a coal tar derivative and is actually two-and-one-half times
more potent than natural estrogen. Id.
11 Estrogen is a female hormone that is useful in treating women with disor-
ders associated with low natural levels of estrogen. Naomi Sheiner, DES and a
Proposed Theory of Enterprise Liability, 46 FoRDHAM L. REV. 963, 963 n.1 (1978).
12 Id. at 963 n.1.
" Laura A. Abrams, The DES Dilemma: A Study in How Hard Cases Make
Bad Law, 59 U. CIN. L. REV. 489, 490 (1990).
14 Thomas Campion, DES and Litigation: The First Ten Years, in EFFECTIVE
16191994]
BROOKLYN LAW REVIEW
In 1939, as word of DES began to trickle across the Atlan-
tic, American pharmaceutical companies filed New Drug Appli-
cations ("NDA") with the Food and Drug Administration
("FDA) 15 seeking approval to market DES in the United
States for the treatment of certain female diseases and condi-
tions.16 The FDA rejected these initial applications because
they relied entirely on foreign studies to establish the safety
and effectiveness of DES." In December 1940, however, the
FDA advised the pharmaceutical companies to form a commit-
tee, which later became known as the "small committee," and
to resubmit a single NDA that combined their clinical studies
concerning DES. 8 In 1941, the FDA approved the small
committee's joint NDA for the use of DES to treat the condi-
tions specified in the NDA-none of which were related to the
use of DES during pregnancy or to prevent miscarriages. 9
Although the small committee had not sought approval in
1941 to use DES during pregnancy, there was evidence that
scientists had discovered an apparent link between miscarriag-
es and low levels of natural estrogen. ° Many studies suggest-
ing that DES could reduce the threat of miscarriage by artifi-
cially raising the level of estrogen in the body were published
in leading medical journals during the 1940s.2 Relying on
COORDINATION OF MULTIPLE PRODUCT LIABILITY LITIGATION 1988, at 315 (PLI
Litig. & Admin. Practice Course Handbook Series No. 344, 1988).
"5 The twelve companies that filed applications with the FDA were: Abbott
Laboratories, Armour Laboratories, Ayerst, McKenna & Harrison, George A. Breon
& Co., Charles E. Froest & Co., Eli Lilly & Co., Merck & Co., Inc., Sharp &
Dohme, Inc., E.R. Squibb & Sons, The Upjohn Co., Winthrope Chemical, Inc. and
John Wyeth & Brother, Inc. See Campion, supra note 14, at 316 n.9.
"' Bichler v. Eli Lilly & Co., 79 A.D.2d 317, 321, 436 N.Y.S.2d 625, 628 (1st
Dep't 1981), affd, 35 N.Y.2d 571, 436 N.E.2d 182, 450 N.Y.S.2d 776 (1982). These
included symptoms of menopause, senile vaginitis, gonorrheal vaginitis and breast
engorgement in post-partum women. Campion, supra note 14, at 316. None of the
proposed applications involved the use of DES in the treatment of pregnant wom-
en or to prevent miscarriages. Bichler, 79 A.D.2d at 321, 436 N.Y.S.2d at 628.
17 Id.
" Id. Eli Lilly chaired the "small committee," which pooled all available infor-
mation concerning DES and its toxicity. The literature Lilly prepared for submis-
sion to the FDA contained warnings that use of DES "was contraindicated only for
women who had cancer or precancerous lesions of the breasts or cervix, or had a
high incidence of breast or genital malignancy." Id.
19 Id.
2 Ashley v. Abbott Lab., 789 F. Supp. 552, 558 (E.D.N.Y. 1992), appeal dis-
missed, 7 F.3d 20 (2d Cir. 1993).
" Two recognized experts in the field of hormonal problems, Drs. George and
1620 [Vol. 59:1617
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these new studies, Eli Lilly in April 1947 filed a supplement to
its 1941 NDA seeking permission to market DES for the treat-
ment of miscarriages and problem pregnancies." The FDA
approved Eli Lilly's application,' despite contradicting stud-
ies about DES usage during pregnancy.' By 1952, the FDA
Olive Watkins Smith of Harvard Medical School, administered large doses of DES
to pregnant women on the theory that DES stimulated the production of proges-
terone, a hormone that helps the uterus maintain a healthy fetus. The doctors
claimed that women who had previously miscarried delivered healthy babies after
taking DES. See, e.g, George V. Smith, M.D., Therapeutic Limitations of Female
Sex Hormones in Gynecologic Conditions, 222 NEW ENG. J. MED. 88 (1940); George
V. Smith, M.D. & 0. Watkins Smith, M.D., Estrogen and Progestin Metabolism in
Pregnant Women: With Especial Reference to Pre-Eclemptic Toxemia and the Effect
of Hormone Administration, 39 Ai. J. OBSTET. & GYNECOL. 405 (1940); George V.
Smith, M.D. & 0. Watkins Smith, M.D., Pituitary Stimulating Property of Stilbes-
trol as Compared with that of Estrane, 57 PROC. SOC. EXPER. BIOL. MED. 198
(1944); George V. Smith, M.D., Therapy with Female Sex Hormones, 23 NEw ENG.
J. MED. 339 (1944); George V. Smith, M.D., Diethylstilbestrol in the Prevention and
Treatment of Complications of Pregnancy, 56 AM. J. OBSTET. & GYNEC. 821 (1948)
[hereinafter Smith, Diethylstilbestrol]; 0. Watkins Smith, M.D. & George V. Smtih,
M.D., DES in the Prevention and Treatment of Complications of Late Pregnancy,
57 AM. J. OBSTET. GYNECOL. 821 (1948); George V. Smith, M.D. & 0. Watkins
Smith, M.D., Use of DES to Prevent Fetal Loss from Complications of Late Preg-
nancy, 241 NEW ENG. J. MED. 562 (1949); see also Karl J. Karnaky, M.D., The
Use of Stilbestrol for the Treatment of Threatened and Habitual Abortions and
Premature Labor: A Preliminary Report, 35 S. MED. J. 838 (1942).
' Campion, supra note 14, at 318 n.22. "The dosage contemplated for [problem
pregnancies] was several times stronger than the maximum permitted in 1941."
Bichler, 79 A.D.2d at 321, 436 N.Y.S.2d at 628.
' Campion, supra note 14, at 318 n.23. Other companies also filed applications
to the FDA: "Squibb, on April 29, 1947; Abbott, on May 15, 1947; Miller, on July
1, 1947; Boyle, on October 20, 1947; McNeil, on December 23, 1947; Premo, on
January 8, 1948; Grant, on May 20, 1948; Physicians', on June 1, 1948; Rexall, on
October 19, 1948; and Lilly (injection), on January 31, 1951." Id.
24 In 1939, three prominent physiologists determined that when DES was ad-
ministered to pregnant rats and mice, the hormone crossed the placenta and had
malforming effects on the fetus. Bichler, 79 A.D.2d at 322, 436 N.Y.S.2d at 629. In
fact, in 1938, Dr. Charles Dodd, one of the British researchers responsible for
synthesizing DES, had published a paper stating that DES actually could cause
miscarriages and abortions. Id. One of the studies cited in Eli Lilly's supplemental
application actually questioned whether DES in large doses would be carcinogenic
to pregnant women, and whether it could affect the hormonal balance in the fetus.
Ironically, Eli Lilly was particularly concerned with problems to the male fetus. Id.
In addition, two of the main studies most influential in convincing the medi-
cal community that DES could prevent miscarriages: Smith, Diethylstilbestrol, su-
pra note 21, and Karl J. Karnaky, M.D., The Use of Stilbestrol for the Treatment
of Threatened and Habitual Abortions and Premature Labor: A Preliminary Report,
35 S. MED. J. 838 (1942), were both criticized for methodological problems, and
subsequent studies failed to duplicate their results. Sheiner, supra note 11, at 963
n.2.
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determined that DES had been proven to be safe." There-
after, hundreds of additional manufacturers were permitted to
enter the market without seeking FDA approval.26 All DES
manufacturers produced the drug from the identical chemical
compound and marketed it as a generic drug.17 Between 1941
and 1970, DES gained tremendous popularity28 and was pre-
scribed to an estimated two million pregnant women.29
During this same period, literally thousands of articles
discussing DES were published."0 Many of these articles,
which criticized the early studies, indicated that DES had no
benefits for pregnant women"1 and, in fact, might be harmful
to the fetus and mother." Then, in 1971 two articles pub-
' Ashley v. Abbott Lab., 789 F. Supp. 552, 558 (E.D.N.Y.), appeal dismissed, 7
F.3d 20 (2d Cir. 1993); Hymowitz v. Eli Lilly & Co., 73 N.Y.2d 487, 502, 539
N.E.2d 1069, 1072, 541 N.Y.S.2d 941, 944, cert. denied, 493 U.S. 944 (1989).
2 It is uncertain exactly how many manufactures produced "DES" between the
years 1947 and 1971. It is estimated that the number of companies was between
94, the number of NDA's that the FDA has on file for DES use during problem
pregnancies, and 300, the number of companies mentioned by one defendant.
Sheiner, supra note 11, at 964 n.3.
27 DES is considered a generic drug because it was produced according to a
specific chemical formula, which remained consistent throughout the industry.
Hymowitz, 73 N.Y.2d at 504, 539 N.E.2d at 1075, 73 N.Y.S.2d at 944.
28 Sheiner, supra note 11, at 964 n.4. "The public has been so frequently told
of the virtue of [DES] . . . that it now takes a courageous physician to refuse this
medication .... This situation, together with the understandable desire to do some-
thing positive toward rescuing a teetering pregnancy, has resulted in the wide-
spread use of diethylstilbestrol in threatened abortion." Id. (quoting William K.
Stevens, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 29, 1977, at A16 (untitled news abstract)).
' Susan Kusner Resnick, In the Graveyard of Western Medicine-Diethylstilbes-
trol, EAST WEST NAT. HEALTH, July-Aug. 1992, at 144. There are also estimates
that as many as 9 million mothers, daughters and sons were exposed to "DES."
Beverly Sigl Felten, The Lingering Tragedy of DES, RN, Aug. 1990, at 36.
"' Campion, supra note 14, at 319 (estimates exceed 10,000 books and articles
discussing "DES").
"' Although articles questioning DES's effectiveness in preventing miscarriages
appeared with some frequency, the drug laws of 1938 required drug manufacturers
to submit only proof of safety to the FDA. Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act
(FDCA) of 1938, ch. 675, § 505(b), 52 Stat. 1052 (1938). Congress amended the
FDCA in 1968 to require proof of effectiveness. Sheiner, supra note 11, at 966
n.12.
32 See, e.g., M. Edward Davis & Nicholas W. Fugo, Ph.D., Steroids in the
Treatment of Early Pregnancy Complications, 142 JAMA 778 (1950); W.J.
Dieckmann et al., Does the Administration of Diethylstilbestrol During Pregnancy
Have Therapeutic Value?, 66 AM. J. OBSTET. & GYNEc. 1062 (1953); Gordon
Rosenblum, M.D. & Eugene Melinkoff, M.D., Preservation of the Threatened Preg-
nancy with Particular References to the Use of Diethylstilbestrol, 55 WESTERN J.
SURG. OBSTET. & GYNEC. 597 (1947).
1622 [Vol. 59:1617
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lished in the New England Journal of Medicine reported a
significant statistical increase in the development of a rare
form of cancer in the daughters of women who had ingested
DES during pregnancy.3 Subsequent research estimated the
incidence of the rare cancer, known as clear-cell adenocarcino-
ma, in DES-exposed daughters to range from 0.14 per 1000 to
1.4 per 1000.14 A more common abnormality detected in DES
daughters was adenosis, a potentially cancerous skin growth
resembling tiny cysts or ulcers on the vagina or cervix."
Adenosis has been reported in 30% to 90% of DES-exposed
daughters.36 Based on these studies of the harmful, latent
effects of DES, the FDA banned the use of DES as a miscar-
riage preventative in 1971.38
Shortly after the FDA's recognition of the danger and
ineffectiveness of DES, daughters claiming injuries3' resulting
from in utero exposure to DES filed hundreds of law suits in
courts across the country.40 Establishing liability on the part
" Peter Greenwald, M.D. et al., Vaginal Cancer After the Maternal Treatment
with Synthetic Estrogens, 285 N. ENG. J. MED. 390 (1971); Arthur L. Herbst, M.D.
et al., Adenocarcinoma of the Vagina, 284 N. ENG. J. MED. 878 (1971).
"' Campion, supra note 14, at 319 n.31. As of 1990, about 500 cases of adeno-
carcinoma cases had been reported in DES daughters (less than 0.1% of the ex-
posed population). See Felten, supra note 29, at 36.
" Adenosis exists in a large percentage of women regardless of DES exposure.
It generally has no adverse effects on those who have it and needs only to be
closely monitored. Campion, supra note 14, at 318 n.37.
36 Sheiner, supra note 11, at 965-66 n.10.
3 Some studies also indicated that women who took DES while pregnant have
an increased chance of developing breast cancer. In addition, DES daughters have
a five-times greater risk of an ectopic pregnancy (pregnancy occurring in an abnor-
mal position) and a three-times greater risk of a premature birth. Studies also
have reported that sons of DES mothers have a higher-than-average rate of genito-
urinary problems, including hypospadias (shortened urethra), meatal stenosis,
epidymal cysts or undescended or hypotrophic testes. Felten, supra note 29, at 36.
3 Hymowitz v. Eli Lilly & Co., 73 N.Y.2d 487, 502, 539 N.E.2d 1069, 1072,
541 N.Y.S.2d 941, 944, cert. denied, 493 U.S. 944 (1989).
" Generally two classes of DES daughters presented claims. The daughters
suffering from adenocarcinoma represented a very small percentage of all DES
suits. By far the greatest number of claims, approximately 95% of all DES cases,
were filed by DES daughters claiming adenosis. Campion, supra note 14, at 320.
There have also been claims brought on behalf of women who claimed no physical
harm as a result of their exposure but who alleged emotional distress for fear of
developing adenocarcinoma in the future. See Gary S. Glickman, DES and Emo-
tional Distress: Payton v. Abbott Labs, 37 U. MIAMI L. REV. 151 (1983).
"1 "DES" daughters filed suits in more than thirty states and the District of
Columbia." Campion, supra note 14, at 320. Other parties claiming injuries have
1994]
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of the manufacturers generally did not present a problem.
Causes of action were based on theories of negligence, strict
product liability, violation of express and implied warranties,
false and fraudulent representation and failure to warn."
However, identifying the specific manufacturer that had pro-
duced the DES that caused a plaintiffs injury raised complex
practical and legal issues.
Identification of the manufacturer was important because
under tort law, liability can only be imposed on a defendant if
a plaintiff proves that it is more likely than not that the con-
duct of a particular defendant was the cause-in-fact of the
damage suffered by the plaintiff.42 This burden has proven to
be insurmountable in most DES cases for a number of reasons.
First, all DES was of identical chemical composition and,
therefore, pharmacists filled prescriptions with whatever brand
was available.43 Second, the number of manufacturers has
been estimated at approximately 300, with many entering and
leaving the market between 1940 and 1971.' Moreover, some
of the companies that produced DES no longer exist, while
others have been assumed by various companies. Finally, the
long latency period of DES injuries, approximately three de-
cades, leads to severe evidentiary problems, including faded
memories, lost or destroyed records and the death of many
witnesses.45
To overcome the problem of identifying the responsible
manufacturer, plaintiffs proffered three theories of liability
also filed suits. See, e.g., Enright v. Eli Lilly & Co., 77 N.Y.2d 377, 570 N.E.2d
198, 568 N.Y.S.2d 550 (1991) (third-generation DES daughters cause of action
denied); Anderson v. Eli Lilly & Co., 158 A.D.2d 91, 557 N.Y.S.2d 981 (3d Dep't
1990) (claim by husband for loss of consortium due to inability to have natural
children properly dismissed).
41 Sindell v. Abbott Lab., 607 P.2d 924, 925 (Cal. 1980) (DES manufacturers
knew or should have known that it was carcinogenic, that there was a grave dan-
ger that after latency DES would cause cancerous and precancerous growth in
daughters of the mothers who ingested it, that DES was ineffective in preventing
miscarriages, that tests which manufacturers relied upon indicated that DES was
not safe or effective and that they failed to warn of its potential danger).
42 W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS, § 41,
at 263-65 (5th ed. 1984).
Hymowitz v. Eli Lilly & Co., 73 N.Y.2d 487, 502, 539 N.E.2d 1069, 1072,
541 N.Y.S.2d 941, 944, cert. denied, 493 U.S. 944 (1989).
44 Id.
45 Id.
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under which the burden of proving identification would be
shifted to the defendants:4 6 alternative liability, concert-of-
action and enterprise liability.4 Several courts, however, re-
jected these theories and adopted a novel approach known as
market share liability.
A. Alternative Liability
Under the "alternative liability" theory, plaintiffs are per-
mitted to join multiple defendants and hold each of them joint-
ly and severally liable.4" This theory was first articulated in
1948 by the California Supreme Court in Summers v. Tice.49
In Summers, the plaintiff was injured when two hunters fired
their guns across a road and one hunter's bullet struck the
plaintiff. It was clear that both hunters were negligent, but the
plaintiff could not prove which hunter's shot had caused the
injury. Rather than dismissing the cause of action and letting
the loss fall on the plaintiff, the court shifted the burden of
proving causation from the plaintiff to the defendants." One
of the policies underlying the court's reasoning was that the
defendants were in a better position than the plaintiff to know
what had happened.51 Some DES plaintiffs claimed that alter-
" KEETON ET AL., supra note 42, § 41, at 271.
4 For a listing of the numerous articles discussing the various theories of
recovery advanced by plaintiffs, see Campion, supra note 14, at 321 n.44.
'" When harm is incapable of being apportioned amongst joint tortfeasors, joint
and several liability allows a plaintiff to recover the entire sum of damages from a
single tortfeasor. If the harm can be divided, however, each defendant is severally
liable, that is, liable only for his share of the harm. See KEETON ET AL., supra
note 42, § 52, at 344-45. When multiple tortfeasors are held jointly liable, one
tortfeasor may have to pay the entire amount of the plaintiffs damages regardless
of the existence of other culpable defendants. Id. § 50, at 336-37. This seemingly
inequitable result may occur when one or more of the multiple tortfeasors is insol-
vent. The tortfeasor that paid the entire judgment, however, may seek contribution
from the other tortfeasors.
49 199 P.2d 1 (Cal. 1948).
o The Restatement of Torts reflects the rule developed in Summers v. Tice:
Where the conduct of two or more actors is tortious, and it is proved
that harm has been caused to the plaintiff by only one of them, but
there is uncertainty as to which one has caused it, the burden is upon
each such actor to prove that he has not caused the harm.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 433(B)(C) (1965).
"1 See Bichler v. Eli Lilly & Co., 79 A.D.2d 317, 325, 436 N.Y.S.2d 625, 630
(1st Dep't 1981) (construing Summers v. Tice, 199 P.2d 1 (Cal. 1948)), aftd, 35
N.Y.2d 571, 436 N.E.2d 182, 450 N.Y.S.2d 776 (1982).
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native liability should be applied in the DES context, because
like the plaintiff in Summers, the DES plaintiffs were unable
to identify which of the many DES manufacturers had caused
their injury.2
For various reasons, however, most courts have not adopt-
ed alternative liability to resolve the DES identification prob-
lem.53 First, courts have found that DES manufacturers are
not necessarily in a better position than the plaintiffs to deter-
mine which company's pill was ingested by the plaintiffs' moth-
ers."4 In most instances, the manufacturers have no records or
direct contact with the patients that take their drug.55 Addi-
tionally, alternative liability assumes that all potentially liable
defendants are joined in the action.56 Unless every defendant
is joined, no rational basis would exist for inferring that one of
the named defendants caused the plaintiff's harm.5" Courts
have found this impractical in the DES situation since there
may be as many as 300 potential defendants, many of which
are no longer in existence. A final problem that has given
courts pause is that the alternative theory holds multiple de-
fendants fully liable for the harm caused by only one of
them.5" When transferred to the DES scenario, one manufac-
turer, which in all likelihood will be unable to exculpate itself,
may be held liable for the harm caused by any one of 300 other
potentially liable defendants. For these reasons, courts gener-
ally have rejected alternative liability as a solution to the iden-
tification problem in DES cases.
5 Sindell v. Abbott Lab., 607 P.2d 924, 930 (Cal.), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 912
(1980).
' Two courts have applied alternative liability. Abel v. Eli Lilly & Co., 289
N.W.2d 20 (Mich. Ct. App. 1980); Erlich v. Abbott Lab., 5 Phila. 249 (Phila. Co.,
Mar. 5, 1981) (available on LEXIS, Mega library, Pamega file).
", The Sindell court stated that although the defendants may not be in a bet-
ter position than the plaintiffs to determine which pill was ingested, this fact in
itself does not prevent application of alternative liability. Sindell, 607 P.2d at 930.
as Id.
56 Id.; see also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTs § 433B cmt. g (1965) (burden
of proof shifts to defendants only if plaintiff can demonstrate that all defendants
acted tortiously and that the harm resulted from one of them).
", Sindell, 607 P.2d at 930. The Sindell court noted that there is actually a
substantial likelihood that the guilty manufacturer would escape liability. Id.
"" Id. at 924.
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B. Concert of Action
Another theory of multiple liability offered by DES plain-
tiffs was "concert of action."59 The concert of action theory im-
poses joint and several liability upon all parties who, in pur-
suit of a common plan or design to commit a tortious act, tacit-
ly or explicitly agree to take part in it actively, or to further
the plan through aid, encouragement or cooperation." Unlike
alternative liability, the general purpose of concert of action
was to deter deviant group activity and not to shift the burden
of proving causation to the defendant.61 Some plaintiffs
claimed that DES manufacturers should be held jointly and
severally liable because they all acted together in failing to test
adequately or warn sufficiently about the dangers of DES,
which they all produced from a "common and agreed upon
formula."6
2
Most courts, however, have found that concert of action is
not a viable theory for assessing liability against DES manu-
facturers.63 The main reason for rejecting concert of action
"' Campion, supra note 14, at 322.
KEETON ET AL., supra note 42, § 46, at 323 (1984). Concert of action is in-
cluded in § 876 of the Restatement of Torts. The typical illustration of concert of
action is the illegal drag race. All parties taking part in a drag race are jointly
and severally liable to an innocent bystander injured by their joint tortious activi-
ty. Unlike alternative liability, concert of action requires agreement amongst defen-
dants to commit tortious activity.
61 Sheiner, supra note 11, at 979.
£2 Sindell, 607 P.2d at 932. The Plaintiffs in Sindell alleged that
defendant's wrongful conduct "is the result of planned and concerted
action, express and implied agreements, collaboration in, reliance upon,
acquiescence in and ratification, exploitation and adoption of each other's
testing, marketing, lack of warnings . . . and other acts or omis-
sions" . . . and that "acting individually and in concert, [defendants]
promoted, approved, authorized, acquiesced in, and reaped profits from
sales" of DES.
Id.
, Two courts have assessed liability based on claims of concert of action. See
Abel v. Eli Lilly & Co., 343 N.W.2d 20 164 (Mich. Ct. App. 1980); Bichler v. Eli
Lilly & Co., 79 A.D.2d 317, 436 N.Y.S.2d 625 (1st Dep't 1981), affd, 35 N.Y.2d
571, 436 N.E.2d 182, 450 N.Y.S.2d 776 (1982). The New York Court of Appeals in
Hymowitz, however, refused to adopt concert of action as the law for New York
"DES" cases. The court stated that concert of action was the law in Bichler only
because the defendant did not object. Hymowitz v. Eli Lilly & Co., 73 N.Y.2d 487,
508, 539 N.E.2d 1069, 1076, 541 N.Y.S.2d 941, 948, cert. denied, 493 U.S. 944
(1989). Other cases that have rejected concert of action are: Ryan v. Eli Lilly &
Co., 514 F. Supp. 1004 (D.S.C. 1981); Payton v. Abbott Lab., 512 F. Supp. 1031
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has been the plaintiffs' inability to prove the existence of a
tacit agreement among DES manufacturers to engage in tor-
tious activity.' The fact that DES manufacturers filed joint
NDAs, relied on each other's tests and agreed on a uniform
chemical composition is only evidence of parallel conduct in
compliance with industry standards.65 Courts have not been
willing to infer a tacit agreement or understanding merely
from such parallel activity.66 Such an implication would great-
ly extend the concert of action doctrine and potentially could
render a single manufacturer liable for the defective products
of an entire industry. As a result, courts have been reluctant
to use concert of action in DES cases.
C. Enterprise Liability
The final theory offered by DES plaintiffs for imposing
joint and several liability on the numerous DES manufacturers
was enterprise liability. Enterprise liability holds all the man-
ufacturers in an industry jointly and severally liable for the
injuries caused by that industry's product. The theory was first
enunciated by Judge Weinstein in Hall v. E.I. DuPont de
Nemours & Co., Inc.6" In Hall, dynamite blasting caps that
were left around old construction areas,69 had been discovered
by children who were subsequently injured when the caps
exploded.7" Unable to identify the manufacturer of the cap
that had exploded, the plaintiffs in Hall joined the six major
domestic manufacturers of blasting caps and the industry's
trade association, alleging that the defendants failed to provide
adequate safety warnings.7' The court found that there was
industry-wide cooperation in the promulgation of safety stan-
(D. Mass. 1981); Sindell v. Abbott Lab., 607 P.2d 924, (Cal.), cert. denied, 449 U.S.
912 (1980); Abel v. Eli Lilly & Co., 289 N.W.2d 20 (Mich. Ct. App. 1980); Lyons v.
Premo Pharmaceutical Lab., Inc., 406 A.2d 185 (N.J. App. Div.), cert. denied, 412
A.2d 774 (N.J. 1979).
64 Campion, supra note 14, at 324.
6' Sindell, 607 P.2d at 932.
e Hymowitz, 73 N.Y.2d at 508, 539 N.E.2d at 1076, 541 N.Y.S.2d at 948.
67 Id.
" 345 F. Supp. 353 (E.D.N.Y 1972).
6' Id. at 382.
70 Id.
71 Id. at 359.
[Vol. 59:1617
ASHLEY v. ABBOTT LABORATORIES
dards and in the design and manufacture of the blasting caps.
Therefore, all defendants jointly shared and controlled the risk
by delegating the determination of safety standards to their
trade association.72 As a result of the industry-wide miscon-
duct, the plaintiffs needed to prove only that the manufacturer
that caused their injury was among the named defendants,
and the burden of identification would then shift.73 Because
the identification problem in the blasting cap case was similar
to that in the DES cases, enterprise liability became an attrac-
tive theory for DES plaintiffs.74 In addition, the DES manu-
facturers, like the manufacturers in Hall, also had cooperated
in the design, testing and marketing of the product. Moreover,
enterprise liability, unlike concert-of-action, was developed to
solve the identification-causation dilemma created when an
untraceable product causes injury.
Although enterprise liability was frequently proffered and
widely discussed,7" DES courts have ultimately rejected the
theory for two major reasons. First, the Hall court specifically
warned against applying enterprise liability in a situation in-
volving a large number of defendants.76 With the existence of
300 potentially liable manufacturers, all of which would not be
joined in one action, the chance that any one defendant manu-
factured the DES that caused a given plaintiffs injury is
slight.77 The second reason for rejecting enterprise liability is
because the regulations that the DES manufacturers followed
were largely suggested or compelled by the government. 8 Un-
like Hall, where the industry created and perpetuated its own
standards, it would be unfair to hold the DES manufacturers
liable for following the safety standards promulgated by the
FDA.
Many courts, however, have modified enterprise liability
and the other theories of multiple liability to fit the exceptional
72 Id. at 375.
73 Id. at 379.
7' The seminal law review article discussing the relationship between DES and
enterprise liability is Sheiner, supra note 11.
71 See Campion, supra note 14, at 328 (attributing the popularity of enterprise
liability to Sheiner, supra note 11).
" Hall, 345 F. Supp. at 378.
7 Sindell v. Abbott Lab., 607 P.2d 924, 930, 931, 935 (Cal.), cert. denied, 449
U.S. 912 (1980).
78 Id.
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circumstances found in DES litigation. These various modifica-
tions led to the creation of market share liability.
D. A New Theory Emerges: Market-Share Liability
In 1980, dissatisfied with existing theories of multiple
liability and unwilling to dismiss DES claims against drug
manufacturers, the California Supreme Court departed from
existing doctrine and created market-share liability.79 In
Sindell v. Abbott Laboratories, the California court held that
the plaintiffs may shift the burden of identification to the de-
fendants if they join the manufacturers of a "substantial" share
of the DES that their mothers might have ingested.8" Any
defendant could then exculpate itself by proving that its DES
was not the cause of the plaintiffs' injuries.8 Each remaining
defendant was liable for the proportion of the judgment repre-
sented by its individual share of the national DES market. 2
In this way, market share liability not only overcame the iden-
tification problem, but it also apportioned damages among the
defendants. 3
The emergence of this theory did not receive universal
approval in the legal community.' Eliminating the burden of
proving identification, regardless of what theory was used, was
criticized as imposing liability that exceeded absolute liabili-
ty.85 Dissenting in Sindell, Justice Richardson stated that to
"[s]trike [the identification] requirement and label what re-
7- Id. at 924.
so Id.
81 Id.
82 Id.
" Id. Later California cases clarified the Sindell opinion. See, e.g., Brown v.
Superior Ct., 751 P.2d 470 (Cal. 1988) (defendants are held severally, but not
jointly, liable); Murphy v. E.R. Squibb & Sons, Inc., 710 P.2d 247 (Cal. 1985)
("substantial" market share requires more than 10 percent of the market).
"' For negative commentary, see David A. Fischer, Products Liability-An Anal-
ysis of market Share Liability, 34 VAND. L. REV. 1623 (1981); Petrina R. Albulescu,
Note, Market Share Liability-The California Roulette of Causation Eliminating the
Identification Requirement, 11 SETON HALL L. REv. 610 (1981); Steven Bonanno,
Note, Presumed Innocent: Illinois' Rejection of Market Share Liability In Smith v.
Eli Lilly & Company Is "Cause In Fact To Celebrate," 24 J. MARSHALL L. REV.
869 (1991).
"s Dale Coggins, Industry-Wide Liability, 13 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 980, 998
(1979).
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mains 'alternative' liability, 'industry-wide' liability, or 'market
share' liability, prov[es] that if you hit the square peg hard and
often enough the round holes will really become square, al-
though you may splinter the board in the process." 6 Nonethe-
less, courts across the country were faced with an onslaught of
DES plaintiffs, revised complaints in hand, proffering market
share liability as the theory de jour.
In the years following Sindell, courts had to decide wheth-
er to accept, reject or modify California's latest judicial fad. 7
Including Sindell, there are currently four variations of market
share liability that have been adopted by the highest courts of
five different states. 8 All of the various theories remove the
burden of identification from the injured plaintiffs and provide
a scheme for apportioning damages among the named defen-
dants. In fashioning a theory of market share liability, courts
struggled with defining the relevant market boundaries to use
when apportioning market shares, under what circumstances
the defendants could exculpate themselves and whether to hold
defendants jointly and severally liable. 9
The New York Court of Appeals in Hymowitz v. Eli Lilly &
Co.90 chose a unique and expansive solution to these compet-
ing issues. First, Hymowitz concluded that a market share
theory should be based on the national market shares of each
manufacturer as of the time the plaintiffs ingested DES.9
Sindell v. Abbott Lab., 607 P.2d 924 (Cal. 1980) (Richardson, J., dissenting).
No court outside of California has adopted the Sindell rationale in its entire-
ty. Christopher J. McGuire, Note, Market-Share Liability After Hymowitz and
Conley: Exploring the Limits of Judicial Power, 24 U. MICH. J.L. REF. 759, 763
n.23 (1991).
" Bonanno, Note, supra note 84, at 869 n.1; see Conley v. Boyle Drug Co., 570
So. 2d 275 (Fla. 1990) (adopting the Martin theory but requiring the plaintiff to
make a genuine attempt to locate and identify the manufacturer responsible for
her injury); Hymowitz v. Eli Lilly & Co., 73 N.Y.2d 487, 539 N.E.2d 1069, 541
N.Y.S.2d 941 (see supra notes 65, 68-69 and accompanying text), cert. denied, 493
U.S. 944 (1989); Martin v. Abbott Lab., 689 P.2d 368 (Wash. 1984) (modifying the
Sindell approach by, inter alia, permitting the plaintiff to sue only one defendant
who then may elect to implead third-party defendants); Collins v. Eli Lilly Co.,
342 N.W.2d 37 (Wisc.), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 826 (1984) (adopting a theory similar
to Martin but requiring damages to be divided among two or more defendants
according to Wisconsin's comparative negligence statute); .
"' For an in-depth discussion of these competing interests and New York's at-
tempt to resolve them, see Aaron D. Twerski, Market Share-A Tale of Two Cen-
turies, 55 BROOK. L. REV. 869 (1989).
so 73 N.Y.2d at 487, 539 N.E.2d at 1069, 541 N.Y.S.2d at 941.
"1 Id. at 511, 539 N.E.2d at 1078, 541 N.Y.S.2d at 950. The market share of
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The court's principal reason for utilizing the national market
share was one of practicality.12 A determination of any mar-
ket smaller than the national one, in addition to being unreli-
able, ostensibly would be unduly burdensome to liti-
gants-especially in light of the possibility that some New
York plaintiffs may have ingested DES in another state.93 The
court also noted that "[ulse of a national market is a fair meth-
od... of apportioning defendants' liabilities according to their
total culpability in marketing DES for use during pregnan-
cy. 9
4
Second, the Hymowitz court ruled that a DES manufactur-
er could not exculpate itself from liability even if it could prove
unequivocally that the plaintiff did not consume its brand of
DES.95 The court stated, "[Tihere should be no exculpation of
a defendant who, although a member of the market producing
DES for pregnancy use, appears not to have caused a particu-
lar plaintiffs injury."" The court reasoned that it would be "a
windfall for a producer to escape liability solely because it
produced a more identifiable pill, or sold only to certain drug-
stores."97
Finally, Hymowitz decided that manufacturers could be
held only, severally liable for their share of a plaintiffs damag-
es, equal to their percentage of the national DES market."
Thus, the absence of some defendants from a case would not
increase the liability of the defendants that were present. In
this way the court could mitigate the harshness of forgoing
exculpation by holding each defendant responsible only for the
proportionate share of harm it caused. The court stated, "[WIe
eschewed exculpation to prevent the fortuitous avoidance of
liability, and thus, equitably, we decline to unleash the same
forces to increase a defendant's liability beyond its fair share of
responsibility."99
each defendant is a factual question to be litigated by the parties. Id. at 511, 539
N.E.2d at 1077, 541 N.Y.S.2d at 949.
Id. at 511, 539 N.E.2d at 1078, 541 N.Y.S.2d at 950.
9- Id. at 511, 539 N.E.2d at 1077, 541 N.Y.S.2d at 949.
94 Id. at 511, 539 N.E.2d at 1078, 541 N.Y.S.2d at 950.
95 Id.
96 Id.
97 Id.
98 Id.
9 Id. at 512-13, 539 N.E.2d at 1078, 541 N.Y.S.2d at 950.
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The combined effect of the New York theory's components
resulted in the abandonment of a causation requirement and
instead "apportion[ed] liability so as to correspond to the over-
all culpability of each defendant, measured by the amount of
risk of injury each defendant created to the public-at-
large.""'0 One well-respected commentator recognized the ap-
portionment of liability based on risk as a step into the twenty-
first century and a break from "senseless obeisance to tradi-
tion.""0  It is precisely that aspect of Hymowitz, however, that
raises questions as to a state or federal court's judicial power
to impose liability on a defendant under New York's expansive
theory of market-share liability. Under a system in which each
defendant will be held liable based upon its share of the na-
tional market, plaintiffs must join every DES manufacturer to
insure full recovery. Yet, existing requirements of personal
jurisdiction, such as minimum contacts and purposeful
availment, represent formidable obstacles to bringing success-
fully all DES manufacturers before a court, thereby impeding
plaintiffs from recovering 100% of their damages. Judge
Weinstein sought to resolve this conflict in his decision in
Ashley."°2
II. ASHLEY V. ABBOTT LABORATORIES
A. Facts and Procedural History
Ashley v. Abbott Laboratories is one of thousands of DES
cases brought against scores of defendants in New York and
throughout the country. The Ashley case is a consolidation of
two separate diversity actions filed in the United States Dis-
trict Court for the Eastern District of New York:... Ashley v.
1& Id. at 512, 539 N.E.2d at 1078, 541 N.Y.S.2d at 950.
'o' Twerski, supra note 89, at 870.
IC' For a prescient account of the problems surrounding Hymowitz's market-
share theory, including personal jurisdictional and federal court standing limita-
tions, see McGuire, supra note 87, at 759.
"03 New York has consolidated all its DES cases under the heading "In re New
York County DES Litigation." The DES cases that were filed in the state supreme
court were assigned to Justice Ira Gammerman, while cases filed in the federal
district court were assigned to Judge Jack B. Weinstein. In re New York County
DES Litig., 142 F.R.D. 58 (E.D.N.Y. 1992). The DES cases are not being handled
as a class action, but rather have been consolidated to ease administration pur-
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Abbott Laboratories and Silveri v. Abbott Laboratories.10 4
Plaintiffs in the consolidated Ashley case claimed injuries re-
sulting from their exposure or their spouses' exposure in utero
to DES.05 The defendants were all manufacturers or distrib-
utors of DES or successors in interest to such companies.'
Two of the named defendants, Boehringer Ingelheim
Pharmaceuticals, Inc. ("Boehringer") and Boyle & Co. ("Boyle")
moved to dismiss the claims against them. Boehringer moved
to dismiss the complaints under Federal Rules of Civil Proce-
dure 12(b)(6) for a failure to state a claim upon which relief
can be granted and 12(b)(2) for lack of personal jurisdic-
tion."0 7 Boyle joined in the 12(b)(2) motion to dismiss for lack
of personal jurisdiction.' 8 The motions of both defendants
with respect to plaintiff Angela Silveri and the Ashley
plaintiffs domiciled in New York were denied.0 9
Following the district court's decision, Boehringer filed a
notice of appeal but subsequently withdrew the appeal at the
suggestion of staff counsel."0 The district court then entered
a judgment to the effect that the case had been resolved
suant to the Case Management Order, Supreme Court, New York County (Ira
Gammerman, J.), entered on or about March 6, 1990, and affirmed by the New
York Appellate Division, 168 A.D.2d 50, 570 N.Y.S.2d 802 (1st Dep't 1991).
"' In Silveri, Angela Silveri moved for permission to introduce evidence that
pharmaceutical manufacturers were responsible for the defective design of DES.
Judge Weinstein denied that motion holding that under New York law, if plaintiffs
are unable to identify the manufacturer of the DES that caused their injury, then
the drug manufacturers' liability would be limited to their share of the market.
Silveri v. Abbott Lab., 789 F. Supp. 548 (E.D.N.Y. 1992).
105 Plaintiffs alleged causes of action in warranty, negligence and strict liability
and sought compensatory and punitive damages. Ashley v. Abbott Lab., 789 F.
Supp. 552, 559 (E.D.N.Y. 1992), appeal dismissed, 7 F.3d 20 (2d Cir. 1993).
106 Id.
107 FED. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(2) & (b)(6).
1' Ashley, 789 F. Supp. at 559. Boyle made the identical motion in an indem-
nity action brought in New York State Supreme Court. The court denied Boyle's
motion with leave to renew following further discovery. Feit v. Emons Indus., No.
81-12026 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. Co. Aug. 9, 1982). The motion apparently was not re-
newed. Ashley, 789 F. Supp. at 591.
1 Id. at 559. Plaintiff Angela Silveri and approximately one-half of the Ashley
plaintiffs were New York residents. Id. With respect to the non-New York Ashley
plaintiffs, defendant's motions were left to be decided at a later date. Id. Judge
Weinstein never wrote an opinion addressing the non-New York plaintiffs, howev-
er, because those plaintiffs and the defendants ultimately reached a settlement.
"' Ashley v. Boehringer Ingelheim Pharmaceuticals, 7 F.3d 20, 24 (2d Cir.
1993).
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through settlement or adjudication on the merits."'
Boehringer later renewed its appeal, fearing that the district
court's jurisdiction and choice of law rulings would be given
preclusive effect by the trial judges in the 42 other DES cases
pending against Boehringer in New York."2 The Second Cir-
cuit, however, dismissed the appeal on the grounds of
mootness and lack of standing."' Yet, the Second Circuit not-
ed that its "decision to decline appellate review of the District
Court's order confirms the lack of any possible collateral estop-
pel effect arising from the District Court's ... ruling.""4
B. The District Court Decision
Ashley presented Judge Weinstein with a problem that
had not been resolved at the state court level" 5 -a problem
" On September 14, 1992, apparently at Boehringer's request, the district court
entered a judgment that provided:
[T]he case having been fully resolved as to all parties and claims by settlement or
adjudication on the merits, it is ORDERED AND ADJUDGED that all of the
claims in this action, including specifically cross-claims, are DISMISSED, without
costs, subject to the rights of any party to re-open the final judgment if any set-
tlement is not consummated.
Id. at 22.
11 Id. at 23. Boehringer contended that the district court rulings were unconsti-
tutional and constituted erroneous interpretations of New York law. Id. at 20.
1.. The Second Circuit found the appeal to be moot because the plaintiffs de-
cined to contest the appeal, neither filing a brief, nor appearing for argument. Id.
More importantly, the court determined that Boehringer lacked standing because
Boehringer had prevailed on the merits by successfully moving to have the
plaintiffs' complaint dismissed. Id. As a general rule, a prevailing party cannot
appeal from a district court judgment in its favor. Id. (citing Cardinal Chem. Co.
v. Morton Int'l, Inc., 113 S. Ct. 1967, 1973 (1993)).
1. Ashley, 7 F.3d at 24. One exception to the rule that a prevailing party can-
not appeal is when the prevailing party is aggrieved by the collateral estoppel
effect of a district court's decision. Id. at 23. The Second Circuit, however, found
that the district court opinion would not have preclusive effect because the judg-
ment entered in the district court was not dependent upon the determination of
the issues that Boehringer was appealing. Id. The Second Circuit stated that the
district court could enter a judgment dismissing the complaint irrespective of the
finding of personal jurisdiction over Boehringer and regardless of whether or not
New York law applied to Boehringer. Id.
" DES litigation concerning causation and liability had, for the most part, been
resolved by various state courts. See generally Enright v. Eli Lilly & Co., 77
N.Y.2d 377, 570 N.E.2d 198, 568 N.Y.S.2d 550, (1991) (no cause of action by third
generation DES daughters against manufacturers), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 197
(1991); Hymowitz v. Eli Lilly & Co., 73 N.Y.2d 487, 539 N.E.2d 1069, 541
N.Y.S.2d 941 (adopting national market share liability in DES cases), cert. denied,
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that Hymowitz's national theory of market-share liability cre-
ated: how must a court treat non-resident drug manufacturers
that are not otherwise amenable to personal jurisdiction in
New York? Boehringer, a Delaware corporation with its princi-
pal place of business in Connecticut, has been licensed and
authorized to do business in New York since its inception in
1971.116 Although Boehringer had never produced or sold
DES, it is responsible for the liabilities of Stayner Corporation
("Stayner"),117 which it acquired in 1979, and which manufac-
tured and sold DES.11 Stayner, however, did not produce or
sell DES in New York.' Consequently, Boehringer claimed
that plaintiffs' suits seeking to impose liability for Stayner's
acts could not proceed in New York, because the court would
493 U.S. 944 (1989); In re DES Market Share Litig., 171 A.D.2d 352, 578 N.Y.S.2d
63 (4th Dep't 1991) (right to a jury in market share trial); In re New York County
DES Litig., 168 A.D.2d 50, 570 N.Y.S.2d 802 (1st Dep't 1991) (affirming case man-
agement order of Gammerman, J.); Wind v. Eli Lilly & Co., 164 A.D.2d 885, 559
N.Y.S.2d 561 (2d Dep't 1990) (delaying plaintiffs' requests for information relating
to appearance of defendant's packaging of DES); Anderson v. Eli Lilly & Co., 158
A.D.2d 91, 557 N.Y.S.2d 981 (3d Dep't 1990) (husband's consortium, claim for loss
of ability to have natural children properly dismissed), affd, 79 N.Y.2d 797, 588
N.E.2d 66, 580 N.Y.S.2d 168 (1991); Clark v. Abbott Lab., 155 A.D.2d 35, 553
N.Y.S.2d 929 (4th Dep't 1990) (effect of revival statute); Besser v. E.R. Squibb &
Sons, 146 A.D.2d 107, 539 N.Y.S.2d 734 (1st Dep't 1989) (foreign statute of limita-
tions, if shorter than New York statute, must apply where cause of action accrues
outside New York), affd, 75 N.Y.2d 847, 552 N.E.2d 171, 552 N.Y.S.2d 923 (1990);
Schaeffer v. Eli Lilly & Co., 113 A.D.2d 827, 493 N.Y.S.2d 501 (2d Dep't 1985)
(collateral estoppel applies to issues of medical effects and manufacturers' inade-
quate testing, but not to issue of proximate cause); Bichler v. Willing, 58 A.D.2d
331, 397 N.Y.S.2d 57 (1st Dep't 1977) (plaintiffs claim against dispensing pharma-
cist properly dismissed); see also Sandberg v. White Lab., 871 F.2d 3 (2d Cir.
1989) (New York revival statute, although applicable to DES, does not apply to
DEN, a similar estrogen compound); Clark v. Eli Lilly & Co., 725 F. Supp. 130
(N.D.N.Y. 1989) (husband's consortium claim properly dismissed where wife's inju-
ries occurred before marriage).
.. Ashley v. Abbott Lab., 789 F. Supp. 552, 559 (E.D.N.Y. 1992), appeal dis-
missed, 7 F.3d 20 (2d Cir. 1993). Boehringer markets its products (which do not
include DES) in all states and is licensed to do business in several other states
besides New York. Id.
"' Boehringer conceded that it is subject to the same tort liabilities as Stayner
would have been had Stayner continued to exist. Id. at 589.
"I Id. Stayner was merged into Boehringer in 1979. Between 1949 and 1971,
Stayner obtained DES from chemical companies in California, Tennessee and Ohio,
manufactured DES at a plant in California and sold tablets in California, Oregon,
Washington and Montana. Id.
.. Affidavits from senior Stayner employees indicate that the company never
was licensed to do business in New York, had an office or agent in New York,
solicited business in New York or shipped DES to New York. Id.
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not have had personal jurisdiction over Stayner.2 ° Boyle, the
second defendant, joined the motion to dismiss, and made a
similar jurisdictional challenge. Boyle is a California corpora-
tion that manufactured and sold DES between 1949 and 1960
in California and other states west of the Mississippi Riv-
er, 2' but Boyle had never manufactured or sold DES in New
York.'22 Boyle argued, therefore, that New York courts lacked
personal jurisdiction under section 302(a)(3)(ii) of New York's
Civil Practice Laws and Rules ("NYCPLR"), 23 and that a
finding of jurisdiction would violate the Federal Due Process
Clause. 24 Rather than tackle the jurisdictional challenges
head-on, Judge Weinstein, in what proved to be a dispositive
switch, first chose to address Boehringer's second ground in its
motion to dismiss-for plaintiffs' failure to state a claim upon
which relief could be granted. 25
1. Failure to State a Claim
Boehringer premised its motion on two theories. First,
Boehringer argued that New York's substantive DES law,
although evincing a strong concern for New York plaintiffs,
nonetheless prohibits suits against a company that never sold
DES in New York.'26 Boebringer pointed out that under New
York law, a DES manufacturer that had never sold DES for
' Id. at 559.
121 Id.
12 Employee affidavits attested that Boyle never was licensed to do business in
New York, maintained an office or agents in New York, or advertised in New
York. Id.
123 N.Y. CIV. PRAc. L. & R. § 302(a)(3)(ii) (McKinney 1992) is New York's long-
arm jurisdiction statute and provides for in personam jurisdiction over:
[Amny non-domiciliary ... who in person or through an agent...
commits a tortious act without the state causing injury to person or
property within the state . . . if he . . . (ii) expects or should reasonably
expect the act to have consequences in the state and derives substantial
revenue from interstate or international commerce....
Id. Boyle claimed that the "causation," "injury" and "reasonable expectation" ele-
ments of the statute had not been satisfied. Ashley, 789 F. Supp. at 592.
12 Ashley, 789 F. Supp. at 592.
12 Id. at 559. It is the normal practice of courts to determine first whether it
has personal jurisdiction over a defendant before addressing substantive mo-
tions-such as failure to state a claim. See infra notes 184-91 and accompanying
text.
1.. Ashley, 789 F. Supp. at 589.
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use during pregnancy is immune from suit.12 7 Boehringer ar-
gued that the same reasoning should apply to a manufacturer
that had never sold DES in New York, because neither manu-
facturer had created any risk to women in New York.128 Al-
ternatively, Boehringer argued that if Hymowitz did permit a
cause of action, then comity'29 and conflicts of law principles,
as well as the Due Process and Full Faith and Credit Clauses
of the Federal Constitution, required application of Califor-
nia3 ° rather than New York law.131
Judge Weinstein rejected Boebringer's motion, holding
that plaintiffs had stated a cause of action against Boehringer
and that New York's law was applicable. 32 Judge Weinstein
presented two reasons. First, unlike a manufacturer that had
never produced DES for use during pregnancy, a manufacturer
that had never sold DES in New York nevertheless could have
caused injury to New York residents. 33 New York residents
could have ingested the DES while in another state or pur-
chased DES in another state and brought it back to New York
to ingest.' Second, Judge Weinstein found it ironic that
Boehringer's argument for dismissal rested on New York's
policy for protecting its residents since it is precisely this policy
that created the cause of action against Boehringer in the first
place.' 35 According to Judge Weinstein, Hymowitz purposely
avoided seeking a causal link between a particular plaintiffs
harm and a particular defendant's acts in order to protect
1" Hymowitz v. Eli Lilly, 73 N.Y.2d 487, 539 N.E.2d 1069, 541 N.Y.S.2d 941,
cert. denied, 493 U.S. 944 (1989) (suits against manufacturers that never produced
or sold DES for use during pregnancy were not allowed because such manufactur-
ers did not create any risk to pregnant women. See also supra notes 90-102 and
accompanying text (discussing the Hymowitz decision).
128 Ashley, 789 F. Supp. at 559.
1 The principles of comity grant a court sitting in one state the discretion to
recognize the law of another state where the application of the other state's law
does not conflict with the public policy of the forum state. Id.
130 Under California law, Boehringer could exculpate itself by proving that its
DES was not the cause of the plaintiffs injury. See Sindell v. Abbott Lab., 607
P.2d 924 (Cal.), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 912 (1980).
131 Id.
132 Id.
133 Id.
13' Hymowitz v. Eli Lilly & Co., 73 N.Y.2d 487, 511, 539 N.E.2d 1069, 1077,
541 N.Y.S.2d 941, cert. denied, 493 U.S. 944 (1989).
13 Ashley v. Abbott Lab., 789 F. Supp. 552, 589 (E.D.N.Y. 1992), appeal dis-
missed, 7 F.3d 20 (2d Cir. 1993).
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injured New York residents, while at the same time fairly
apportioning liability among defendants.'36  As such,
Boebringer's reliance upon this policy was misplaced. As to
Boehringer's second argument, that California law should
apply, Judge Weinstein held that under New York's choice-of-
law rules, the New York Court of Appeals would apply New
York substantive law.137 Judge Weinstein noted that a find-
ing that the law of each defendant's state was applicable would
cripple the New York Court of Appeals' attempt to process
DES cases efficiently. 3
2. Personal Jurisdiction
After denying Boehringer's motion to dismiss for failure to
state a claim, Judge Weinstein then proceeded to address
Boyle and Boehringer's motions to dismiss for lack of personal
jurisdiction. Two inquiries are necessary to determine whether
New York may exercise personal jurisdiction over either of the
two defendants.'39 First, New York law must authorize the
court to exercise personal jurisdiction.' Under New York
, Id.
1: The choice-of-law analysis required the evaluation of several factors including
whether the states' laws are in direct conflict, whether the conflict concerns con-
duct-regulation or loss-distribution, which state has a greater interest in having its
substantive law applied, and where the tortious activity occurred. For an exhaus-
tive discussion of New York choice-of-law rules, see Harold L. Korn, The Choice-of-
Law Revolution: A Critique, 83 COLUM. L. REV. 772 (1983).
Although the conflict-of-laws issue in Ashley is beyond the scope of this Com-
ment, the importance of conflict of laws in mass torts is profound and presents
many difficult problems. See, e.g, Aaron D. Twerski, With Liberty and Justice for
All: An Essay on Agent Orange and Choice of Law, 52 BROOK. L. REV. 341 (1986).
Since liability ultimately will depend on a state's substantive law, defendants, for
the most part, are more concerned about which state's substantive law will be
applied than in which court room they must litigate the dispute. Issues of person-
al jurisdiction nevertheless are important because if a state has sufficient contacts
to exert personal jurisdiction, then that state will apply its own substantive law.
See Paul S. Bird, Note, Mass Tort Litigation: A Statutory Solution to The Choice
of Law Impasse, 96 YALE L.J. 1077, 1089 (1987) (emphasizing the tendency of
state courts to favor forum law).
" Ashley, 789 F. Supp. at 568. A contrary finding would have rendered the
Ashley opinion moot, as far as Judge Weinstein was concerned, because the defen-
dants would have been able to exculpate themselves under California DES law,
thereby inhibiting the plaintiffs' full recovery.
139 Id. at 569.
14. See Arrowsmith v. United Press Int'l, 320 F.2d 219 (2d Cir. 1963) (en banc).
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law, sections 301 and 302 of the NYCPLR produced possible
bases of personal jurisdiction."' If the inquiry satisfies New
York standards, the exercise of personal jurisdiction must then
be measured against federal due process requirements.4  The
traditional federal due process test for personal jurisdiction re-
quires that the defendant have sufficient "minimum contacts"
with the forum such that maintenance of the suit does not
offend "traditional notions of fair play and substantial jus-
tice."43 Under both state and federal law, the plaintiff bears
the burden of proving facts supporting the exercise of personal
jurisdiction."4
a. New York Law
The first provision that Judge Weinstein considered to
determine whether New York could exercise personal jurisdic-
tion over either of the defendants was NYCPLR section
301.' One basis of personal jurisdiction recognized under
section 301 is consent.'46 A foreign corporation that files a
certificate of authority to do business in New York is consid-
ered to have consented to be sued in New York upon any cause
of action, regardless of where the cause of action arose. 7
Such an exercise of jurisdiction is known as general personal
jurisdiction.' Since Boehringer was licensed to do business
141 Section 301 provides that "[a] court may exercise such jurisdiction over per-
sons, property or status as might have been exercised heretofore." This section
codified existing personal jurisdiction law at the time of the section's enactment in
1962. N.Y. Civ. PRAC. L. & R. § 301 (McKinney 1993).
In contrast, § 302 is New York's long-arm statute, providing for jurisdiction
over non-resident defendant's under certain circumstances. See supra note 123.
1 See, e.g., International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310 (1945).
1 Id. at 316 (quoting Milliken v. Meyer, 311 U.S. 457, 463 (1940)).
14 Hoffritz for Cutlery, Inc. v. Amajac, Ltd., 763 F.2d 55, 57 (2d Cir. 1985);
Connell v. Hayden, 83 A.D.2d 30, 34, 443 N.Y.S.2d 383, 388 (2d Dep't 1981).
14 Ashley v. Abbott Lab., 789 F. Supp. 552, 568 (E.D.N.Y. 1992).
146 N.Y. Civ. PRAC. L. & R. § 301(4) (McKinney 1993).
. See N.Y. Bus. CORP. LAW §§ 304, 1304 (McKinney 1986); LeVine v. Isoserve
Inc., 70 Misc. 2d 747, 334 N.Y.S.2d 796, 799 (Sup. Ct. Albany Co. 1972) (citing,
inter alia, Bagdon v. Philadelphia & Reading Coal & Iron Co., 217 N.Y. 432, 111
N.E. 1075 (1916) ("[wlhen a foreign corporation is licensed to do business in New
York, it consents to be sued on issues of action arising within and without the
state")).
14" Ashley, 789 F. Supp. at 590. General jurisdiction is exercised when a
defendant's contacts with the forum are so extensive as to amount to "presence"
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in New York, it was amenable to jurisdiction under NYCPLR
section 301. Therefore, the lack of any forum-related contacts
by Stayner (Boehringer's predecessor) was irrelevant in assess-
ing Boehringer's amenability to personal jurisdiction in New
York. 4
9
The second defendant, Boyle, had no prior contacts with
New York and, thus, NYCPLR section 301 did not apply.'
Under New York's long-arm statute (section 302(a)(3)), howev-
er, a court may exercise personal jurisdiction over a non-domi-
ciliary who "commits a tortious act without the state causing
injury to person or property within the state .... .,,' To sat-
isfy this provision, in addition to causing injury in state, the
non-domiciliary must also "expect[ ... or... reasonably ex-
pect[] [its] act to have consequences in the state and derive[]
substantial revenue from interstate or international com-
merce." '152 Thus, whether New York could exercise personal
within that state for jurisdictional purposes. As a consequence of the fictional
.presence," the defendant is amenable to personal jurisdiction in that forum irre-
spective of where the acts underlying a particular claim occurred. See Helicopteros
Nacionales de Colombia, S.A. v. Hall, 466 U.S. 408 (1984). See generally Lea
Brilmayer et al., A General Look at General Jurisdiction, 66 TEx. L. REv. 721
(1988).
"' Ashley, 789 F. Supp. at 590. Boehringer contested jurisdiction under
NYCPLR § 301, claiming that since New York could not have exercised jurisdic-
tion over Stayner, the state was also precluded from exercising jurisdiction over its
successor corporation, Boehringer. Id. Judge Weinstein, however, rejected this argu-
ment, relying heavily on Justice Gammerman's decision in Akerman v. Abbott
Lab., No. 90-7669 (1st Dep't Aug. 21, 1991). In Akerman the Court found
Boehringer amenable to personal jurisdiction for DES suits under § 301 of the
NYCPLR. Judge Weinstein noted that there are numerous cases supporting juris-
diction over a successor corporation with no forum contacts on the basis of the
contacts of its predecessor. Ashley, 789 F. Supp. at 590 (citing Simmers v. Ameri-
can Cyanamid Corp., 576 A.2d 376 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1990) (discussing such cases),
cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 62 (1991)). In this instance, however, the forum was exer-
cising personal jurisdiction over the successor corporation based on the successor
corporations forum contacts even though it was the acts of its predecessor that
were at issue (acts that took place outside the forum). Nonetheless, because
Boehringer had consented to general jurisdiction, which extends to causes of action
"not arising out of or related to the defendant's contacts with the forum," juris-
diction under § 301 was appropriate. Ashley, 789 F. Supp. at 589 (quoting
Helicopteros, 466 U.S. at 414).
' ' Section 301 also provides for jurisdiction over foreign corporations doing
business in New York, doing business through an affiliate in New York and juris-
diction by estoppel. None of these other bases applied to Boyle.
'z N.Y. CiV. PRAC. L. & R. § 302(a)(3) (McKinney 1986).
, Z Id. Section 302(a)(3) contains another provision that could also be satisfied in
conjunction with "causing injury instate" to permit the exercise of personal juris-
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jurisdiction over Boyle depended on how section 302(a)(3) was
interpreted by New York courts and, in the instant case, by
Judge Weinstein.
15 3
The first requirement of the long arm statute is that the
defendant have committed a tortious act outside the state that
caused injury within the state."4 Since Boyle distributed
DES outside of New York, the tortious act, if any, occurred
outside the state.'55 Yet, whether Boyle caused injury within
New York was more complicated. Initially, Boyle claimed that
it did not "cause" injury in New York because such a determi-
nation had not been proven.'56 Judge Weinstein, however,
dismissed this argument, relying on substantive New York
DES law. He noted that under market share liability, plaintiffs
are not required to prove that a particular defendant caused
their injury.'57 But section 302(a)(3) does require the plaintiff
to prove that the injury giving rise to the plaintiffs claim oc-
curred within New York.' Judge Weinstein reasoned that
the plaintiffs either ingested DES in New York or were resi-
dents of New York when the drug acted upon them or their
progeny and, therefore, New York was the situs of the inju-
ry
159
Once Judge Weinstein found that Boyle had caused injury
within New York, he was faced with an even more formidable
obstacle-satisfying the second requirement of section
302(a)(3). Section 302(a)(3)(ii) requires that the defendant
diction. Subsection (a)(3)(i) permits personal jurisdiction over a non-resident defen-
dant who: "regularly does or solicits business, or engages in any other persistent
course of conduct, or derives substantial revenue from goods used or consumed or
services rendered, in the state." Id.
This subsection, however, is inapplicable because there was no evidence that
Boyle regularly conducted business in New York.
153 Ashley, 789 F. Supp. at 569.
"' N.Y. CIV. PRAC. L. & R. § 302(a)(3).
155 See Naples v. City of New York, 34 A.D.2d 577, 309 N.Y.S.2d 663 (2d Dep't
1970) (sale of defective fireman's coat outside of New York which caused injury in
New York was a tortious act outside the state).
"' Ashley, 789 F. Supp. at 592.
157 "It would be counterproductive to Hymowitz policy to pose such a require-
ment as a procedural bar to their recovery." Id.
... See Diskin v. Starck, 538 F. Supp. 877 (E.D.N.Y. 1982) (where plaintiffs'
injury occurred in Vermont, New York jurisdiction cannot be predicated on §
302(a)(3) merely because further damage was suffered in state on account of earli-
er injury sustained outside of the state).
159 Ashley, 789 F. Supp. at 570.
1642 [Vol. 59: 1617
ASHLEY v. ABBOTT LABORATORIES
"expects or should reasonably expect [its] act to have conse-
quences in the state and derives substantial revenue from
interstate or international commerce."6 ° The revenue ele-
ment was not at issue since Boyle had received substantial
revenue from commerce in several states. 6' Proving that
Boyle reasonably should have expected that its selling DES in
states west of the Mississippi River would have consequences
in New York, however, presented Judge Weinstein with a diffi-
cult problem. The lack of even a single contact between Boyle
and New York rendered satisfaction of this requirement impos-
sible under existing New York case law.
Judge Weinstein argued, however, that New York case law
interpreting the "reasonable expectations" element of NYCPLR
section 302(a)(3)(ii) provided no controlling authority in the
DES/mass tort context, because "[elach [case] involved tradi-
tional tort suits by individual plaintiffs against individual
providers of goods and services."6 2 According to Judge
Weinstein, because DES cases were not traditional tort cases
(one defendant and one plaintiff), and because the defendants
involved manufactured generic goods and participated in a
national market,63 the Ashley defendants could not rely on
the fact that they never expected their products to have any
contact with New York."M
Instead, Judge Weinstein crafted an analysis applicable to
mass torts that satisfies the "reasonable expectation" require-
ment of New York's long-arm statute. He reasoned that "all
DES manufacturers knew that their acts were having forum
consequences in New York."'65 This implied knowledge was
attributed to the fact that since DES was a "perfectly fungible
consumer item," the sale of the item by a manufacturer in one
locality would cause other manufacturers to seek different
markets in which to sell DES.66 In other words, the national
" N.Y. Civ. PRAC. L. & R. § 302 (a)(3)(ii).
161 Ashley, 789 F. Supp. at 569.
162 Id. at 571.
" Id. at 572.
I /d.
16 Id.
16 Id.
Defendants' engagement in the national DES industry alerted them to
the fact that their conduct in marketing generic DES in one part of the
country would have economic and trade flow consequences in every other
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DES market was like a pond-entry into which by a manufac-
turer at any point had direct and foreseeable ripple effects in
every other state.167 Judge Weinstein concluded that DES
manufacturers should have "reasonably expected" participation
in the national DES market to have consequences in New
York, thereby satisfying the second requirement of New York's
long-arm statute.16
This line of reasoning, however, must rest on New York
law, because a federal district court trying a case based on
diversity jurisdiction is constrained by the Erie doctrine.169
Specifically, Judge Weinstein was required to resolve the juris-
diction question "in a manner consistent with the court's in-
formed prediction of what the New York Court of Appeals
would do when faced with the same issue."7 ° Judge
Weinstein interpreted the Hymowitz decision as providing "a
direct link between jurisdictional and substantive components
of DES litigation by imposing several, rather than joint and
several, liability."7 ' As a result of this, Judge Weinstein rea-
soned, DES plaintiffs' full recovery would be frustrated if all
manufacturers could not be brought into court."2 According-
ly, Judge Weinstein held that "Hymowitz and the New York
Civil Practice Law and Rules as well as legislative policy must
thus be read as favoring a jurisdictional reach consistent with
part, including New York. There was here a true national market encour-
aged and protected by the Commerce Clause of the federal Constitution
and national drug regulations, not a series of discreet inward-looking and
unrelated markets.
Id.
167 Id. at 576.
" Id. at 572. Although the use of Hymowitz to modify personal jurisdiction
appeared to be applied retrospectively against Boyle, Judge Weinstein stated that
"[t]he fact that DES manufacturers did not anticipate Hymowitz or the jurisdiction-
al consequences flowing from that decision is not significant. The parties in this
suit are governed by the substantive common law and jurisdictional law in effect
at the time of the suit." Id. at 572 (citations omitted); cf Conley v. Boyle Drug
Co., 570 So. 2d 275 (Fla. 1991) (when applying long-arm statute in DES cases
jurisdiction must be determined based on the date of manufacture and distribution
of DES).
1. Erie R.R. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938), requires all federal courts sitting
in diversity to apply the forum's substantive law and to interpret that law in
accordance with the way the highest court of that state would interpret it.
170 Ashley, 789 F. Supp. at 571.
171 Id.
172 Id. at 572.
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the national market share rationale and the adoption of sever-
al liability."
173
b. Federal Due Process
The exercise of personal jurisdiction over these two defen-
dants, however, still had to satisfy constitutional standards of
due process. As to Boehringer, Judge Weinstein held that the
assertion of personal jurisdiction over a corporation that is
licensed to do business in the forum is consistent with the
requirements of Federal Due Process. 174 The due process in-
quiry as to Boyle, however, was more complicated. Judge
Weinstein framed this issue as "whether the Constitution lim-
its the ability of New York State to provide full compensation
to residents injured by a product sold in the national mar-
ket."'75 Having thus set the terms of the inquiry, Judge
Weinstein undertook an extensive analysis and critique of
current federal due process law.' He emerged with a new
theory of due process applicable to mass torts, which is pre-
mised on the forum's interest in resolving the dispute.
According to Judge Weinstein's modified due process anal-
ysis, manufacturers of products sold in the United States may
be sued in any state in which the plaintiffs reside-irrespective
of the manufacturers' lack of contact within the forum-if two
requirements are satisfied. First, there must be a substantial
state interest in resolving the dispute. 7 To discern the req-
uisite "substantial state interest," Judge Weinstein looked to
173 Id.
17, Ashley, 789 F. Supp. at 591 ("IT]he Constitutionality of the traditional prac-
tice of asserting general jurisdiction solely on the basis of a corporation's being
licensed to do business in the forum seems to have survived International Shoe.")
(citing Burnham v. Superior Court, 495 U.S. 604 (1990); Neirbo Co. v. Bethlehem
Shipbuilding Corp., 308 U.S. 165 (1939)). Judge Weinstein also applied the modi-
fied theory of personal jurisdiction and due process that he had developed for
Boyle to Boehringer. Ashley, 789 F. Supp. at 592. However, since Boehringer
would have been amenable to jurisdiction under existing law, that analysis was
unnecessary.
17 Ashley, 789 F. Supp. at 573.
171 Id. at 573-89.
17 "W]hether the litigation raises issues whose resolution would be affected by,
or have a probable impact on the vindication of, policies expressed in the substan-
tive, procedural or remedial laws of the forum." Id. at 587.
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New York's substantive DES law. 17' According to this law, a
defendant drug manufacturer cannot exculpate itself by at-
tempting to prove that its drug did not cause the plaintiffs'
injury.'79 Judge Weinstein thought this rule to be indicative
of New York's substantial interest in fully compensating resi-
dent plaintiffs.8 0 Once a substantial state interest is shown,
then "the assertion of jurisdiction will be considered constitu-
tional unless, given the actual circumstances of the case, the
defendant is unable to mount a defense in the forum state
without suffering relatively substantial hardship."'' Boyle
failed to meet this requirement, because it had not made a
showing that it would suffer any undue burden by defending in
New York.182 Thus, Judge Weinstein concluded that the as-
sertion of personal jurisdiction over Boyle under NYCPLR
section 302(a)(3) was consistent with due process.183
III. ANALYSIS
A close analysis of the Ashley decision reveals that Judge
Weinstein's modified theory of personal jurisdiction for mass
tort cases not only contradicts existing standards of personal
jurisdiction and due process, but also raises troubling ques-
tions concerning the proper role of a district court judge. To
reach his desired outcome of exercising personal jurisdiction
over the non-resident drug manufacturers, Judge Weinstein
embarked upon a long and arduous journey that ultimately
spanned 103 pages in the Federal Supplement. He crafted the
178 Id. at 559.
179 Hymowitz v. Eli Lilly & Co., 73 N.Y.2d 487, 541 N.Y.S.2d 941, 539 N.E.2d
1069, cert. denied, 493 U.S. 944 (1989).
' Ashley, 789 F. Supp. at 591-93.
'8' Id. at 587.
Evidence to be considered in determining the defendant's relative hard-
ship includes, inter alia, (1) the defendant's available assets; (2) whether
the defendant has or is engaged in substantial interstate commerce; (3)
whether the defendant is being represented by an indemnitor or is shar-
ing the cost of the defense with an indemnitor or co-defendant; (4) the
comparative hardship defendant will incur in defending the suit in anoth-
er forum; and (5) the comparative hardship to the plaintiff if the case
were dismissed or transferred for lack of jurisdiction.
Id.
18 Id. at 594.
183 Id.
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Ashley decision, which looks and reads more like a law review
article than a judicial opinion, to dispense systematically with
each procedural, substantive and constitutional issue that
threatened to derail the delivery of his theory. First, Judge
Weinstein ignored Second Circuit law when he decided to ex-
amine substantive New York DES law before determining
whether the defendants were properly before the court. Judge
Weinstein then reinterpreted New York's long-arm statute in a
manner inconsistent with existing state law and in violation of
the Erie doctrine. Finally, Judge Weinstein crafted a new theo-
ry of personal jurisdiction applicable to mass torts, predicated
on a state's interest in resolving the dispute, which violates a
defendant's due process rights. This pioneering judicial exer-
cise left a trail of discarded precedent marking the path to a
theory of personal jurisdiction that jeopardizes the due process
rights of defendants.
A. Resolving Substance Before Procedure
The first hurdle that Judge Weinstein faced was the se-
quence in which to address Boehringer's two motions."
Judge Weinstein noted that the normal practice is to consider
12(b)(2) motions prior to 12(b)(6) motions "[oln the theory that
a court ought to first determine whether a party is properly
present before considering substantive issues.... ,,185 If Judge
Weinstein first had addressed the personal jurisdiction claim
outside the mass tort/DES context, however, he would have
been forced to launch an immediate frontal attack on existing
standards of personal jurisdiction. Instead, by addressing the
12(b)(6) motion first, he was able to discuss substantive New
York DES law to establish a foundation from which he could
later justify his attack on accepted principles of personal juris-
diction. Yet, Judge Weinstein was not compelled to reverse the
order of the motions and disregard Arrowsmith v. United Press
International186 because Boehringer clearly was amenable to
general jurisdiction under NYCPLR section 301.18' Rather, he
1' Boehringer advanced both the 12(b)(6) motion and the 12(b)(2) motion. Boyle
joined only in the 12(b)(2) motion. Id. at 559.
" Id. at 559 (citing Arrowsmith v. United Press Int'l, 320 F.2d 219, 221 (2d
Cir. 1963)).
... 320 F.2d at 219.
1"7 In fact, one New York court previously had found Boehringer amenable to
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inverted the order for the strategic purpose of presenting a
more persuasive case for modifying existing standards of long-
arm jurisdiction based on New York's substantive DES law
and, ultimately, for exercising jurisdiction over Boyle. Thus, by
ignoring Arrowsmith, Judge Weinstein was able to create his
theory of personal jurisdiction in a more persuasive manner,
namely with the alleged support of New York substantive law.
A problem, however, with this seemingly innocuous switch
is that the Second Circuit had ruled definitively on this issue
in Arrowsmith.85 In that case the Second Circuit held that
"[n]ot only does logic compel initial consideration of the issue of
jurisdiction over the defendant-a court without such jurisdic-
tion lacks power to dismiss a complaint for failure to state a
claim-but the functional difference that flows from the ground
selected for dismissal likewise compels considering jurisdiction
and venue questions first."189 This rule acknowledges that a
motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim is granted with
prejudice whereas a determination that the court lacks person-
al jurisdiction does not preclude a subsequent action in the
appropriate forum.1" As a result, Judge Weinstein's analysis
of the motion to dismiss was legally meaningless. 191
B. Personal Jurisdiction
After denying Boehringer's motion to dismiss for failure to
state a claim, Judge Weinstein then proceeded to address the
jurisdictional challenges. Boehringer was licensed to do busi-
ness in New York and, therefore, was amenable to general
jurisdiction. Boyle, however, having no past or current contacts
with New York was not amenable to general jurisdiction. The
only way personal jurisdiction could be exercised over Boyle
was under New York's long-arm statute. Interestingly, New
general jurisdiction in New York for DES suits. Akerman v. Abbott Lab., No. 90-
7669 (1st Dep't Aug. 21, 1991).
18 320 F.2d at 219.
189 Id. at 221.
190 Id.
181 Although Judge Weinstein had no intention of dismissing the claim, he could
not have done so according to the mandate of Arrowsmith. In Arrowsmith, the
Second Circuit reversed the district court for proceeding to dismiss for failure to
state a claim before resolving the jurisdictional issue. Id.
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York never intended the reach of the statute to extend as far
as the limits of jurisdiction permissible under the Federal
Constitution.'92 In fact, one of the original drafters of the
statute was Judge Weinstein. Nonetheless, Judge Weinstein
interpreted the long-arm statute in a way that far exceeded the
limits of federal due process as well as existing New York case
law.
1. NYCPLR 302: Causation and Foreseeability
Judge Weinstein first misapplied the long-arm statute by
finding that Boyle had caused injury within the state. Al-
though Boyle committed a tortious act without the state, it did
not cause injury within New York. The general rule as to in-
state injury is that "the situs of the injury is the location of the
original event which caused the injury, not the location where
the resultant damages are subsequently felt by the plain-
tiff."' 93 DES cases present an interesting problem in making
this determination due to the long latency period involved
before injury is realized. Whether the location of the original
injury-causing event should be defined as where the mother
first ingested the drug, where the infant is conceived and,
thereby, exposed to the drug in utero, where the infant is born,
or where the child ultimately discovers the injury is difficult to
ascertain. Using the time of ingestion as the original incident
necessary to cause injury makes the most practical sense. If a
DES mother or child was pursuing damages for fear of future
harm or increased risk of future harm, then only the date of
ingestion would make sense as the original injury-causing
event. The other events, birth or in utero exposure, are far too
speculative on which to base such a claim, and looking to the
discovery of the injury would preclude a claim for fear of future
harm. Judge Weinstein agreed that the "injury-causing event
in these cases was the mothers' ingestion of DES."'94 Yet that
event could not have occurred in New York, since Boyle had
..2 Ashley v. Abbott Lab., 789 F. Supp. 552, 569 (E.D.N.Y. 1992) (citing Banco
Ambrosiano v. Artoc Bank & Trust, 62 N.Y.2d 65, 71, 464 N.E.2d 432, 435, 476
N.Y.S.2d 64, 67 (1984)), appeal dismissed, 7 F.3d 20 (2d Cir. 1993).
... Carte v. Parkoff, 152 A.D.2d 615, 543 N.Y.S.2d 718, 719 (2d Dep't 1989)
(citations omitted).
1. Ashley, 789 F. Supp. at 592.
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never sold DES in New York. 195
To avoid the reality that Boyle's drug could not have been
ingested in New York, Judge Weinstein decided that the locus
or situs of the injury is the place of exposure, not just the place
of ingestion, and therefore that New York is the situs of the
original event.1 96 "Where, as here, an allegedly harmful drug
is ingested in New York, or acts upon a resident of the state
while the resident is in the state or her progeny when they are
in the state, the situs of the injury is New York."'97 Judge
Weinstein contended that although the injury-causing event
was the ingestion of DES, all plaintiffs had been exposed to
DES in utero while in New York.
198
As a matter of statutory construction, this application of
section 302 contradicted all existing case law, which held that
the location of the original event that caused the injury con-
trols-not the place where the injury is discovered or where
damages are subsequently felt. Where plaintiff sustains an
injury outside of New York, a claim that the plaintiff suffered
further damage in New York based upon the earlier injury is
insufficient to establish personal jurisdiction under NYCPLR
section 302(a)(3).' 99 It appears as though Judge Weinstein
focused principally upon the fact that all plaintiffs were resi-
1 None of the plaintiffs offered any evidence that they had purchased DES in
a state in which Boyle sold DES and then ingested it in New York, or that they
had purchased Boyle's DES in New York. Even if plaintiffs had purchased DES in
another state and brought it into New York, Boyle still would not have been ame-
nable to personal jurisdiction under the long-arm statute. See Martinez v. Ameri-
can Standard, 91 A.D.2d 652, 457 N.Y.S.2d 97 (2d Dep't) (mere likelihood that a
product will find its way into New York is insufficient without some purposeful
affiliation), afld, 60 N.Y.2d 873, 458 N.E.2d 826, 470 N.Y.S.2d 367 (1983).
" Ashley, 789 F. Supp. at 570. Judge Weinstein claimed that New York was
the location where the DES had been ingested. Id. at 592. Yet, there is no indica-
tion that the plaintiffs had ingested Boyle's DES in New York. While it is true
that many, if not all, of the New York plaintiffs ingested DES in New York, the
proper question is not whether they did so, but rather if Boyle's product caused
injury in New York for purposes of personal jurisdiction.
197 Id. at 570.
199 Id. at 592.
1 Rios v. Marshall, 530 F. Supp. 351 (S.D.N.Y. 1981); see also Ditchik v.
Baines, 665 F. Supp. 350 (S.D.N.Y. 1987) (where malpractice occurred in New
Jersey, resultant injury suffered while in New York does not provide for injury
within state); Black v. Oberle Rentals, Inc., 55 Misc. 2d 398, 285 N.Y.S.2d 226
(Sup. Ct. Onondaga Co. 1967) (original injury must occur within state, not result-
ing damage).
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dents or domiciliaries of New York."' Yet, the mere fact that
injured plaintiffs are New York residents or are domiciled in
New York has never been held a sufficient basis for jurisdic-
tion under the long-arm statute."1
Moreover, even Judge Weinstein's broad interpretation of
"original injury-causing event" fails to link the plaintiffs' inju-
ries directly with Boyle's DES."2 Therefore, personal jurisdic-
tion based on the long-arm statute should have failed before
ever passing the first requirement. Relying on substantive New
York DES law, however, Judge Weinstein declared that since
DES plaintiffs did not have to prove causation under
Hymowitz, Boyle could not escape from jurisdiction based upon
that fact.20 3 Judge Weinstein thus disregarded the first re-
quirement of section 302(a)(3) and held that Boyle had caused
injury within New York. He justified such a drastic departure
from precedent and statutory construction on a commingling of
substantive New York DES law with personal jurisdiction law.
The second requirement of section 302(a)(3), whether
Boyle reasonably expected its activity to have forum conse-
quences, presented an even more challenging problem for
Judge Weinstein. Clause (ii) of subparagraph (3) seeks to en-
sure that New York's long-arm statute will not conflict with
federal due process standards.2"4 According to federal due
" Ashley, 789 F. Supp. at 559 (stating that this opinion only applies to plain-
tiffs domiciled in New York); Id. at 570 (stating that DES acted upon residents of
the state while in state or upon her progeny while in state).
2. See Mayer v. Josiah Wedgwood & Sons, Ltd., 601 F. Supp. 1523 (S.D.N.Y.
1985); Miji Assoc. v. Halliburton Servs., 552 F. Supp. 418 (S.D.N.Y. 1982); Fantis
Foods, Inc. v. Standard Importing Co., 49 N.Y.2d 317, 402 N.E.2d 122, 425
N.Y.S.2d 783 (1980); Bissinger v. DiBella, 141 A.D.2d 595, 529 N.Y.S.2d 516 (2d
Dep't 1988); Bramwell v. Tucker, 107 A.D.2d 731, 484 N.Y.S.2d 92 (2d Dep't
1985); McGowan v. Smith, 72 A.D.2d 75, 423 N.Y.S.2d 90 (4th Dep't), affd, 52
N.Y.2d 268, 419 N.E.2d 321, 437 N.Y.S.2d 643 (1979).
22 See supra note 196.
..
3Boyle also contends that it cannot be shown to have committed tortious
acts "causing" injuries as required by section 302(a)(3)(ii). This argument,
while perhaps cogent under the common law applicable to individual
torts, is untenable as to mass torts controlled by Hymowitz. As a matter
of substantive New York law, DES plaintiffs are not required to prove
that a particular plaintiff caused their injuries. It would be counterpro-
ductive to Hymowitz policy to pose such requirements as a procedural
bar to their recovery.
Ashley, 789 F. Supp. at 592.
21 N.Y. CIv. PRAC. L. & R. § 302 (C302:24 Practice Commentary) (McKinney
1993).
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process requirements, mere foreseeability that a defendant's
acts occurring outside the state will have consequences within
the state, without more, is an insufficient basis for a state to
exercise personal jurisdiction."5 To avoid a potential conflict
with federal due process standards, New York courts have
required defendants to undertake some purposeful act that
invokes the benefits and protection of New York law. 0 6 Since
Boyle did not purposefully avail itself of the New York market
or of the protection of New York's laws, trying to prove that it
should have reasonably expected its corporate acts to have
consequences in New York was futile. Judge Weinstein ac-
knowledged that existing jurisdictional law would be inade-
quate to satisfy this requirement and declared that "precedent
is here only a slight inhibitant against rational decision-mak-
ing."0 7 Realizing that an even more drastic departure from
existing law was necessary to satisfy the second requirement of
the long-arm statute than was required to satisfy the first,
Judge Weinstein invoked the Erie doctrine.. and proceeded
to interpret New York DES law under Hymowitz as providing
for nationwide jurisdiction, thereby granting him license to
apply the long-arm statute in a manner consistent with that
interpretation.
2. A Misinterpretation of Hymowitz
Judge Weinstein's mistaken assertion that the New York
Court of Appeals' adoption of several liability in Hymowitz was
indicative of desire to create national jurisdiction is belied by
the language of Hymowitz. The Hymowitz court explicitly stat-
ed that several liability will, as a practical matter, "prevent
some plaintiffs from recovering 100% of their damages."0 9
The shortfall, the court noted, would occur when all the manu-
20 Asahi Metal Indus. Co. v. Superior Court, 480 U.S. 102 (1987); World-Wide
Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286 (1980).
2" Martinez v. American Standard, 91 A.D.2d 652, 457 N.Y.S.2d 97 (2d Dep't
1982), affd, 60 N.Y.2d 873, 458 N.E.2d 826, 470 N.Y.S.2d 367 (1983).
27 Ashley, 789 F. Supp. at 571.
200 Id. at 581. By invoking the Erie doctrine, Judge Weinstein was able to claim
that he merely was interpreting the long-arm statute consistent with the way that
the New York Court of Appeals would in light of Hymowitz.
20 Hymowitz v. Eli Lilly & Co., 73 N.Y.2d 487, 539 N.E.2d 1069, 541 N.Y.S.2d
941, cert. denied, 493 U.S. 944 (1989).
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facturers were not before the court in a particular case."'
The Hymowitz court was well aware that not all defendants
could be brought into every case: "the liability of DES produc-
ers is several only, and should not be inflated when all partici-
pants in the market are not before the court in a particular
case."2M1 It is true that Hymowitz held that a defendant could
not exculpate itself by proving that it did not produce the inju-
ry causing DES."2 In so doing, however, the New York court
apparently was concerned with defendants already properly be-
fore the court21 3 trying to exculpate themselves by raising fac-
tual evidence that in most cases would be difficult or impossi-
ble for DES mothers to contradict or rebut.1 4 The language
of Hymowitz assumed that the manufacturer is amenable to ju-
risdiction. Indeed, the question of jurisdiction arises before any
consideration of the actual cause-in-fact inquiry, such as
whether a women took one shape pill or purchased DES from a
certain drug store. Due to the lapse of time, this type of factual
question cannot be ascertained with certainty. Comparing the
selling of DES to a particular drug store to Boyle's selling
outside of New York, however, is fallacious. The fact that a
manufacturer is claiming that it sold DES only to certain drug
stores within a state tends to indicate that jurisdictional inqui-
ries have already been satisfied. But Boyle did not merely
argue that it had not caused these plaintiffs' injuries. Rather,
Boyle contested New York's power to adjudicate this dispute.
Ultimately, for Judge Weinstein to jump from Hymowitz's
decision to prohibit exculpation to a conclusion that Hymowitz
provides for nationwide jurisdiction seems little more than a
leap of faith.
In addition, Judge Weinstein's interpretation of Hymowitz
210 Id.
211 Id.
21 Id. at 512, 539 N.E.2d at 1078, 541 N.Y.S.2d at 950.
213 There was no discussion of personal jurisdiction in the Hymowitz decision.
214 "[T]here should be no exculpation of a defendant who, although a member of
the market producing DES for pregnancy use, appears not to have caused a par-
ticular plaintiffs injury. It is merely a windfall for a producer to escape liability
solely because it manufactured a more identifiable pill, or sold only to certain
drugstores." Id. at 511, 539 N.E.2d at 1078, 541 N.Y.S.2d at 950.
The non-exculpation rule was used to deny Boehringer's motion to dismiss for
failure to state a claim, but it was not raised again when Judge Weinstein at-
tempted to interpret Hynowitz as providing for nationwide jurisdiction.
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is inconsistent with the Court of Appeals' rationales for adopt-
ing a national market share theory. The Hymowitz court, after
reviewing market share theories used in other jurisdictions,
concluded that the use of a national market is preferable for
essentially practical reasons.21 The Hymowitz court first ex-
plained that "the reliable determination of any market smaller
than the national one likely is not practicable."216 The court
then acknowledged that a national market share theory will
result in a disproportion between a manufacturer's liability
and the actual injuries that the manufacturer caused in New
York."7 The discrepancy between liability and fault exists be-
cause the national theory would not provide a reasonable link
between liability and the risk a defendant created to a partic-
ular plaintiff.21 The Hymowitz court stated that the "[u]se of
a national market is a fair method, we believe, of apportioning
defendant's liabilities according to their culpability in market-
ing DES for use during pregnancy." '219 Hymowitz, therefore,
was concerned primarily with ease of administration and find-
ing a way to apportion damages for defendants who were prop-
erly before the court and for plaintiffs who could not identify
the manufacturer that had caused their injury, but not to pro-
vide a theory that would permit nationwide personal jurisdic-
tion. Thus, while Hymowitz offered an equitable solution to the
identification and apportionment problems present in DES
litigation, Judge Weinstein instead interpreted it to expand
greatly on long-arm jurisdiction.
In fact, there was no indication that the New York Court
of Appeals intended to provide for, or alter, personal jurisdic-
tion. In addition to the reasons articulated by the court for
adopting such an expansive market share theory, the court's
silence concerning personal jurisdiction should have been read
as indicative of its desire to leave jurisdictional questions un-
changed-especially if no question of personal jurisdiction had
been raised. A prior DES decision, Fleishman v. Eli Lilly,"'
provides evidence of the Court of Appeals' reluctance to make
21 Id. at 511, 539 N.E.2d at 1077, 541 N.Y.S.2d at 950.
216 Id. at 511, 539 N.E.2d at 1077, 541 N.Y.S.2d at 949.
217 Id. at 511, 539 N.E.2d at 1077, 541 N.Y.S.2d at 950.
218 Id. at 512, 539 N.E.2d at 1077, 541 N.Y.S.2d at 950.
219 Id.
20 62 N.Y.2d 888, 467 N.E.2d 517, 478 N.Y.S.2d 853 (1984).
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such a drastic departure from existing law. Fleishman present-
ed the court with an issue concerning DES plaintiffs that, like
the personal jurisdiction question faced by Judge Weinstein,
required the abandonment of existing precedent and statutory
interpretation to promote plaintiffs' recovery. In Fleishman,
the New York Court of Appeals affirmed the Appellate
Division's decision to dismiss thousands of DES plaintiffs'
claims because the statute of limitations had expired. The
Court of Appeals concluded that there was nothing in the re-
cord to warrant departure from prior decisions and that any
departure from the policies underlying these well-established
precedents is a matter for the legislature and not the
courts.22' Rather than creating new law, the Fleishman court
explicitly chose to defer to the New York legislature. In con-
trast, instead of deferring to the legislature or certifying the
jurisdiction issues to the New York Court of Appeals,222
Judge Weinstein elected to create a new body of personal juris-
diction law.
By placing the cart before the horse, Judge Weinstein
concluded that because New York law permits a cause of ac-
tion against the defendants, a fortiori, the defendants must
also be amenable to personal jurisdiction.223 This blurring of
the distinction between substantive New York DES law and
the issue of personal jurisdiction enabled Judge Weinstein to
declare that he merely was interpreting the long-arm statute
consistent with the New York Court of Appeals. But such a
commingling of substantive law and long-arm jurisdiction is
explicitly rejected in the Practice Commentary to New York
Civil Practice Law and Rules:
Whether the manner of the accident is foreseeable may have
substantive implications as to the liability of the defendant, but
issues of ultimate liability must never be confused with jurisdiction-
al issues. The liability issue is whether defendant should pay for the
wrong to the plaintiff; the jurisdictional issue is whether defendant
221 Id. at 889, 467 N.E.2d at 517, 478 N.Y.S.2d at 854.
" Under New York Rules of Court § 500.17, the Second Circuit is permitted to
certify a question to the New York Court of Appeals. Thus, Judge Weinstein first
would have had to certify the question up to the Second Circuit in order to certify
it to the New York Court of Appeals.
' Ashley v. Abbott Lab., 789 F. Supp. 552, 572 (E.D.N.Y. 1992), appeal dis-
missed, 7 F.3d 20 (2d Cir. 1993).
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should be compelled to litigate the liability issue in this stateY4
Nonetheless, Judge Weinstein ruled that "any manufacturer of
DES, by its participation in the national marketing of a gener-
ic drug, should 'reasonably expect' its act of selling in the na-
tional market 'to have,' as NYCPLR § 302(a)(3)(ii) puts it,
'consequences in the state.' 225
3. The Pond Theory
Judge Weinstein was able to reach the conclusion that
Boyle should reasonably have foreseen that its act of selling
DES in the national market would have effects in New York by
relying on his pond theory.2 6 Judge Weinstein premised the
pond theory, to a large extent, on the fungible nature of
DES.2 He assumed that because DES is a generic product,
manufacturers would avoid competing in the same market and
would instead seek other markets in which to sell their prod-
uct.2 Consequently, Judge Weinstein asserted, a manufac-
turer's entrance into the DES market, at any point, had direct
and foreseeable ripple effects on every other part of the mar-
ket, much like tossing a pebble into a pond.229 This reasoning
is not only an expansive departure from existing law, but it is
also flawed.
The pond theory, as Judge Weinstein referred to it, was a
clever way of disguising the "stream of commerce" theory
which, without additional "contacts" between the defendant
and the forum, has been rejected by both state and federal
courts. Whether a single manufacturer places its goods into
22 N.Y. CIV. PRAc. L. & R. § 302 (Practice Commentary by Joseph M.
McLaughlin) (McKinney 1993).
Ashley, 789 F. Supp. at 572.
226 Id.
2217 Id.
m Id.
229 Id. at 576.
23 The Supreme Court rejected the stream of commerce theory, which posited
that placing a product in the stream of commerce should be sufficient to confer
jurisdiction, in World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286 (1980),
and again in Asahi Metal Indus. Co. v. Superior Court, 480 U.S. 102 (1987). See
also Martinez v. American Standard, 91 A.D.2d 652, 457 N.Y.S.2d 97 (2d Dep't)
(mere likelihood that a product will find its way into New York is insufficient
without some purposeful affiliation), affd, 60 N.Y.2d 873, 458 N.E.2d 826, 470
N.Y.S.2d 367 (1982). But see Pamela J. Stephens, Sovereignty and Personal Juris-
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the stream of commerce or an entire industry does so with a
generic product-that manufacturer, unless specifically target-
ing a market, has not purposefully availed itself of every
state's law in which its product fortuitously lands.2"' The fact
that DES is a fungible product should not alter the rule that a
manufacturer's amenability to suit does not travel with its
product. 2 According to Judge Weinstein, the presence of
Boyle's DES in any market had foreseeable ripple effects in
New York. Yet, if this reasoning is carried to its logical end,
the sale of any product in one market would have some conse-
quence in every other market in which the same or similar
product is sold. Jurisdiction based on such an attenuated theo-
ry would render it impossible for a corporation to predict
where it would be amenable to suit and undermine its ability
to conform its conduct.
2 33
In addition, the fact that DES is a generic product does
not prevent competition within a market. Certain markets,
whether because of population, demographics, age characteris-
tics or advantageous laws, would attract many manufacturers
regardless of the presence of other manufacturers. Some manu-
facturers may rely on increased advertising or their good repu-
tation to try to boost their share of a certain market without
considering the effect that their action may have on every
other market. Thus, the notion that drug manufacturers were
somehow forced into different markets based on the presence
of a manufacturer in one particular market does not necessari-
ly hold true. Moreover, the national character of the DES mar-
diction Doctrine: Up The Stream of Commerce Without a Paddle, 19 FLA. ST. U. L.
REv. 105 (1991) (in-depth account of stream of commerce cases and criticism of the
Supreme Court's Asahi decision).
"' The defendant must perform some action "purposefully directed toward the
forum state .... The placement of a product into the stream of commerce, with-
out more, is not an act of the defendant purposefully directed toward the forum
state." Asahi, 480 U.S. at 112.
' The Supreme Court in World Wide Volkswagen stated that "foreseeability
alone has never been a sufficient benchmark for personal jurisdiction . . . [,] " be-
cause if this were the rule then "amenability to suit would travel with the chat-
tel." 444 U.S. at 295-96.
' The cost of insurance for even the smallest manufacturer would have to
reflect the risk of being sued in every jurisdiction in which it may cause "ripple
effects" and, therefore, become amenable to personal jurisdiction. In addition, un-
der the pond theory, the number of states in which a product will have measur-
able effects changes as more manufacturers enter the market.
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ket was a result of market forces, not a concerted effort on the
part of all DES manufacturers to create a national market or
somehow to divide the market among themselves. The unfortu-
nate national popularity of DES, although largely attributable
to the early DES manufacturers and medical literature, should
not be used as a predicate to establish foreseeability of suit on
the part of all future manufacturers. Subsequent producers
have little control over the effect that prior marketing and
publicity, whether favorable or unfavorable, may have on the
success of their entrance into the market. While it is true that
prudent companies will take advantage of the existence of a
propitious or fertile market, such sound capitalism should not
be made unfairly burdensome to the local merchant. Although
the corporation that distributed its product in thirty-five states
may be minimally affected if held accountable in all fifty
states, under Judge Weinstein's theory the regional producer
that targets one or two markets may face prohibitive insur-
ance, liability and litigation costs. Ultimately, Boyle could not
have reasonably foreseen that the sale of DES west of the
Mississippi would affect residents of New York, and it should
not have been subject to a law suit there.
C. Federal Due Process
1. Traditional Concepts
The final obstacle preventing Judge Weinstein from exer-
cising personal jurisdiction over Boyle was the Due Process
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. New York's exercise of
personal jurisdiction, whether general or long-arm, is restricted
by the defendant's right to due process. Due process is an elu-
sive term that one commentator has defined as "the process to
which one is entitled; the process to which one has a right; the
process which it would be wrong to deprive one of."2"4 Yet, as
Judge Weinstein noted, "[Tihere is considerable doubt about
the current existence of a unitary, coherent jurisdictional due
process standard."235 This being so, Judge Weinstein chose
'4 Morton, supra note 9, at 3.
"s Ashley v. Abbott Lab., 789 F. Supp. 552, 573 (E.D.N.Y. 1992), appeal dis-
missed, 7 F.3d 20 (2d Cir. 1993).
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the Ashley decision not only to proffer his pond theory and to
reinterpret New York's long-arm statute and the purpose un-
derlying New York's substantive law, but also to craft a new
theory of federal due process applicable to mass torts.
For the past 120 years, the Supreme Court has struggled
to define a workable standard of personal jurisdiction consis-
tent with its interpretation of the Due Process Clause. The
difficulty stems, in large part, from its vacillation between two
competing interpretations of due process-a federalism analy-
sis and a fairness analysis. The federalism analysis seeks to
prevent the encroachment of a state's sovereign power by limit-
ing the adjudicatory power of each state's court. This analysis
focuses on whether a defendant has contacts with a state suffi-
cient to grant that state the authority to command obedience
from the defendant. Conversely, the fairness analysis of due
process determines whether it is fair and reasonable to subject
a party to the jurisdiction of the court. Under this analysis,
courts examine the burden on the defendant to defend in the
forum, the interest the state has in resolving the dispute and
the plaintiffs' interest in obtaining redress. Inconsistent appli-
cation of these analyses and a shift in emphasis from the sov-
ereignty to the fairness analysis has hindered the evolution of
a single, coherent theory of personal jurisdiction and produced
a murky body of in personam law.
Traditionally, a state's power to adjudicate disputes was
dictated by its borders; only if the defendant could be found
within the state's borders could the court exercise its power
over that defendant. 6 This territorial limitation on a state's
adjudicatory power was established in 1878 in the famous case
of Pennoyer v. Neff.23 "The authority of every tribunal is nec-
essarily restricted by the territorial limits of the State in which
it is established. Any attempt to exercise authority beyond
those limits would be deemed in every other forum, as has
been said by this court, an illegitimate assumption of pow-
er.""8 The theoretical underpinnings of this limitation rested
on the notion that each state in a system of federalism retains
" Due process, in addition to requiring personal jurisdiction, also requires
service of process and an opportunity to be heard.
23 Ashley, 789 F. Supp. at 573.
238 Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. 714, 720 (1878).
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its sovereignty. "[Elvery State possesses exclusive jurisdiction
and sovereignty over persons and property within its territo-
ry.... The several States are of equal dignity and authority,
and the independence of one implies the exclusion of power
from all others.""9 The Pennoyer Court, however, never
linked territorial jurisdiction to the Due Process Clause.24 °
Rather, the sovereignty analysis was based on principles de-
rived from international law.241 According to these principles,
the several states of the United States are to be treated as
separate, independent countries.242 As a result, the original
analysis of personal jurisdiction centered around a physical
connection or territorial nexus between the defendant and the
state.
The Pennoyer framework, requiring a state to have physi-
cal power over a defendant, frustrated courts' efforts to exert
personal jurisdiction for some fifty years. The rise of a national
economy and advances in travel and communication, however,
generated a need for jurisdiction over non-residents and cor-
porations.243 But, according to Pennoyer the court only had
the authority to render a binding personal judgment against a
defendant if the defendant: was served with process while
physically present within the state;2  was served while out-
side the state, provided the defendant was domiciled within
the state;245 or had consented to be sued in that state.246
21 Id. at 722.
24 Morton, supra note 9, at 459-60.
241 Pennoyer, 95 U.S. at 722.
242 Id.
243 Allan R. Stein, Styles of Argument and interstate Federalism in the Law of
Personal Jurisdiction, 65 TEX. L. REV. 689, 695 (1987).
244 Pennoyer, 95 U.S. at 714.
21 Pennoyer alluded to permitting a state to exert jurisdiction over its
domiciliaries. Id. at 734. Jurisdiction over domiciliaries, however, was not explicitly
recognized until Milken v. Meyer in 1940. The state's authority over its citizens,
even if absent from the state, was premised on the concept that 'the state which
accords [its citizens] privileges and affords protection to [them] and [their] property
by virtue of [there] domicile may also exact reciprocal duties." Milken v. Meyer,
311 U.S. 457, 462-64 (1940).
' The consent theory was explicitly provided for in Pennoyer where the court
noted, "Neither do we mean to assert that a state may not require a non-resident
entering into a partnership or association within its limits, or making contracts
enforceable there, to appoint an agent or representative in the State to receive
service of process .. . ." 95 U.S. at 735; see also McDonald v. Mabee, 243 U.S. 90
(1917) (submission to the jurisdiction by appearance sufficient to confer jurisdic-
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The last two situations were based on the theory that the state
and the defendant had entered into a relationship that ren-
dered the defendant "present" within the state for purposes of
jurisdiction. Courts developed the notion that defendants could
consent to the jurisdiction of a state in order to overcome the
strict presence requirement of Pennoyer, while still retaining
Pennoyer's basic framework.247
In 1945, the Supreme Court finally appeared ready to rid
due process of the encumbrances of Pennoyer's territorialism in
the landmark case of International Shoe Co. v. Washington.24
The International Shoe Court provided the famous "minimum
contacts" test:
Due process requires only that in order to subject a defendant to a
judgement in personam, if he be not present within the territory of
the forum, he have certain minimum contacts with it such that
maintenance of the suit does not offend "traditional notions of fair
play and substantial justice." 4
The broad language and general applicability of the test led to
a plethora of subsequent cases interpreting its scope. ° Con-
siderable confusion has resulted from the joining of the con-
cepts of fairness and contacts. As one commentator asked,
"[Wlas the ultimate inquiry intended to be whether the defen-
dant had certain objective contacts with the forum, such that if
they were present, fairness would be presumed, or was the
ultimate inquiry intended to be whether the assertion of juris-
diction was fair?"251 Courts in subsequent cases have strug-
gled to answer this question. 2
tion).
247 Stein, supra note 243, at 696. States were permitted to require out-of-state
businesses to consent to jurisdiction within a state as a pre-condition to conducting
commercial activity there. See St. Clair v. Cox, 106 U.S. 350, 356 (1882). The
Court expanded this concept even further by holding that the use of a state's
highways by non-resident drivers effectuated an implied consent to be amenable to
jurisdiction in that state. Hess v. Pawloski, 274 U.S. 352, 356 (1927). These ex-
panded notions of personal jurisdiction, however, still remained faithful to the
Pennoyer concept that the defendant was, somehow "present" (literally or meta-
phorically) within the state.
248 326 U.S. 310 (1945).
249 Id. at 316 (quoting Millikin, 311 U.S. at 465).
2 See Stein, supra note 243, at 694 (suggesting that various interpretations of
"minimum contacts" can be grouped into three categories: regulatory need, ex-
change and convenience).
21 Morton, supra note 9, at 454.
22 Burnham v. Superior Court, 495 U.S. 604 (1990) (physical presence in-state
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2. The Weinstein "Formulation"
In Ashley, Judge Weinstein chose to provide a unique
solution to the question of what the proper due process inquiry
should be in mass torts cases. He opined that "[wlhereas there
is a plausible rationale for the continued reliance on the 'forum
state interest' component.., the territorial nexus requirement
is, at least in mass tort cases, an unnecessary and debilitating
element of the fairness inquiry."253 Judge Weinstein acknowl-
edged that courts continue to use two separate in-
quires-sovereignty and fairness.254  According to Judge
Weinstein, however, the territorial notions of sovereignty,
which continue to play an important role in due process analy-
sis, "must be regarded as an historical accident." 5 In addi-
tion, he argued that the territorial nexus was enunciated in
Pennoyer without the foresight of mass torts.25 Relying on
still sufficient to confer general jurisdiction over individuals); Asahi Metal Indus.
Co. v. Superior Court, 480 U.S. 102 (1987) (the assertion of jurisdiction, even if
'minimum contacts' exist, must be fair) (plurality opinion); Phillips Petroleum Co.
v. Shutts, 472 U.S. 797 (1985) (plaintiffs need not have "minimum contacts" with
the forum); Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462 (1985) (contractual
relations by non-resident franchisee with in-state franchisor, inter alia, should
make franchisee reasonably anticipate out-of-state litigation); Helicopteros
Nacionales de Colombia, S.A. v. Hall, 466 U.S. 408 (1984) (mere purchases are not
enough to warrant jurisdiction for acts unrelated to forum activities where in-state
acts are not systematic and continuous); Keeton v. Hustler Magazine, Inc., 465
U.S. 770 (1984) (sale of magazines in forum sufficient to confer jurisdiction for a
libel claim arising from the sale of those magazines); World-Wide Volkswagen
Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286 (1980) (mere fact that product finds it way into a
state where it causes injury is not enough without some direct or indirect effort
by manufacturer to market product in forum); Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235
(1958) (unilateral acts of plaintiff insufficient to make defendant amenable in fo-
rum where defendant otherwise would have no contacts); McGee v. International
Life Ins. Co., 355 U.S. 220 (1957) (assumption of an insurance obligation by for-
eign insurance company, inter alia, sufficient minimum contacts to haul foreign
insurer in state); Perkins v. Benguet Consol. Mining Co., 342 U.S. 437 (1952) (sys-
tematic and continuous in-state activity by defendant is sufficient to confer general
jurisdiction for acts not arising from those acts).
25 Ashley v. Abbott Lab., 789 F. Supp. 552, 584 (E.D.N.Y. 1992), appeal dis-
missed, 7 F.3d 20 (2d Cir. 1993).
2" Id.
25 Id. The fact that Pennoyer relied on principles of international law, and not
Constitutional Due Process interpretation, was to Judge Weinstein a historical
accident. See also Ralph U. Whitten, The Constitutional Limitations on State-Court
Jurisdiction: A Historical-Interpretative Reexamination of the Full Faith and Credit
and Due Process Clauses, 14 CREIGHTON L. REv. 735 (1981).
256 Ashley, 789 F. Supp. at 584.
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these considerations, Judge Weinstein decided that the territo-
rial nexus requirement was inapplicable to mass tort cases
because it only hindered their resolution."' The crucial fac-
tor, according to Judge Weinstein, was whether the forum had
a substantial interest in adjudicating the dispute."' "A court
must consider the burden on the defendant, the interest of the
forum State, and the plaintiffs interest in obtaining relief."259
Judge Weinstein completely dismissed the "minimum contacts"
prong of the analysis and, instead, focused solely on the fair-
ness to the defendant. Moreover, in determining whether the
assertion of jurisdiction was fair, rather than focusing solely on
the actual effect it would have on the defendant, Judge
Weinstein included considerations of the forum's and the
plaintiffs' interests in adjudicating the dispute.
Such an interpretation of fairness is inconsistent with the
Supreme Court's assertion in International Shoe that fairness
to the defendant should be measured by the defendant's pres-
ence in the forum.26 The International Shoe test indicated a
relationship between the concepts of "minimum contacts" and
fairness: "[W]hether due process is satisfied must depend...
upon the quality and nature of the activity in relation to the
fair and orderly administration of the laws which it was the
purpose of due process to insure."6 1 Whether two separate
inquires are required, or fairness is to be measured simply by
reference to minimum contacts is debatable.262 What is clear,
however, is that fairness alone-without any minimum con-
tacts-has never been sufficient to confer jurisdiction.263
217 Id. at 586.
9 Id.
211 Id. at 574.
211 International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316-17 (1945).
21 Id. at 319.
2C2 See Morton, supra note 9, at 9 (arguing that only one test combing the two
concepts is the correct interpretation of International Shoe); cf. Irving v. Owens-
Coming Fiberglass Corp., 864 F.2d 383 (5th Cir. 1989) (two-part test used).
2" Judge Weinstein relied on Phillips Petroleum v. Shutts, 472 U.S. 797 (1985),
as indicative of the Supreme Court's willingness to alter personal jurisdiction in
extremely large cases. Ashley, 789 F. Supp. at 576. Shutts, however, held that
minimum contacts between the forum and the plaintiffs were unnecessary because
the plaintiffs' due process rights were not in question; in fact, they chose the fo-
rum. This is not analogous to the DES context since the defendants had not cho-
sen New York as a forum or market and, thus, their due process rights were
jeopardized.
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Moreover, evaluating fairness to the defendant based on the
state's and plaintiffs' interests not only ignores the defendant's
contacts, but renders the defendant amenable to jurisdiction
based on the unilateral acts of the plaintiff-a principle that
the Supreme Court has specifically rejected.264
In addition, by focusing on the forum's interest in protect-
ing its residents and ignoring the defendant's contacts with the
forum, the analysis shifts from that of personal jurisdiction to
one of subject-matter jurisdiction. The forum state will always
have an interest in adjudicating a dispute involving its resi-
dents. That interest, however, focuses on the connection be-
tween the plaintiff and the forum, not the defendant and the
forum. When a court deems a particular case or controversy
sufficiently important to give rise to an "important state inter-
est," it makes a substantive determination that the case is the
type that the court ought to decide, which is unrelated to the
defendant's forum-related contacts.265 Due process protects
individual rights, not state rights. States do not have individu-
al rights that should enter into the due process analysis. Such
an analysis violates the central role of a court in our ad-
versarial system. As one commentator has noted, "The court, in
our system of jurisprudence, is traditionally a neutral, unbi-
ased arbiter, not a quasi-party having concerns and interests
to be vindicated during the course of, and perhaps at the ex-
pense of, the interests of private parties to a dispute."266
Whether a defendant should be amenable to suit in a state
cannot turn on a unilateral decision by the state any more
than it can turn on the unilateral act of the plaintiff.6
Finally, by creating a special due process analysis, one
supposedly applicable only to mass tort defendants, Judge
Weinstein ignores an inherent assumption in our constitution-
al system-that all defendants are equally entitled to due
process of law. Merely because one class of defendants appears
to have caused an exceptionally far-reaching mass injury does
not-and should not-give the court the right to violate those
" Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235 (1958) (unilateral acts of plaintiff insuffi-
cient to make defendant amenable in forum with which defendant would otherwise
have no contacts).
2" Morton, supra note 9, at 493.
21 Id. at 494.
26 Hanson, 357 U.S. at 235.
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defendants' right to due process. If our adversarial system
operated on such an ad hoc basis, then the Fourth and Fifth
Amendments would have been discarded long ago, for example,
to curb the rampant crime and drug abuse in American cities.
To remain true to the due process clause and fair to defen-
dants and plaintiffs, however, the only proper focus is to exam-
ine objectively the purposeful contacts between the defendant
and the forum.
CONCLUSION
While the complex problems that mass torts pose to our
society and legal system cannot be ignored, the Ashley decision
represents an extreme and unnecessary departure from exist-
ing sound legal principles. It is troublesome that Judge
Weinstein felt the need to distort the personal jurisdiction
issue to such a degree simply to ensure that the plaintiffs
received full recovery. It is even more problematic that such a
drastic departure from existing state law took place at the
federal district court level. No doubt that reform needs to take
place to deal effectively with mass torts, and that Judge
Weinstein is a pioneer in that area. At the same time, howev-
er, judicial modification of existing law should proceed cau-
tiously and fairly so that the due process rights of future de-
fendants and the recovery of future plaintiffs will not hinge on
the creativity of the presiding judge. Drastic and sudden
changes in existing law, by contrast, can cause uncertainty and
unfairness and, thus, should be left to the legislature.
Michael F. Marchetti
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